Managerial Risk-taking Incentives and Executive Stock Option Repricing: A Study of US Casino Executives

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Rogers
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Executive Stock Option ◽  
Managerial Risk ◽  
Option Repricing ◽  
Stock Option Repricing

An examination of executive stock option repricing

2001 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Carter
Keyword(s):  
Stock Option ◽  
Executive Stock Option ◽  
Option Repricing ◽  
Stock Option Repricing

Option repricing and executive retention – revisited

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 499-517
Author(s):  
Sandra Renfro Callaghan ◽  
Chandra Subramaniam ◽  
Stuart Youngblood
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Executive Stock Option ◽  
Managerial Talent ◽  
Option Repricing ◽  
Stock Option Repricing

Purpose This paper aims to directly test the assertion by proponents of executive stock option repricing that repricing leads to increased management retention. Previous studies find either no effect or decreased retention following stock price repricing. This paper uses a more precise research design to re-examine the relationship between stock option retention and management retention. Design/methodology/approach The authors use an empirical methodology and construct a sample of 158 firms and 201 repricing events, and a control sample of 201 non-repricing firms. They then examine executive turnover in the four years following the stock option repricing event. Findings It was found that, consistent with agency theory, stock option repricing actually results in greater executive retention. Specifically, CEO retention is significantly greater for repricing firms relative to non-repricing firms for up to three years following the repricing date, and non-CEO executive retention is significantly greater for two years. Research limitations/implications Firms continue to restructure management through stock option repricing. However, recent option repricing has been undertaken during a period when the economy is in decline, making it is difficult to disentangle effects of option repricing on management retention. Hence, this paper uses repricing data from an earlier period, from 1992-1997, when the economy was good. Originality/value Many firms argue that when stock options are out-of-the-money and managerial talent is in demand, repricing executive stock options is necessary to retain managers. Previous studies find contradictory or no support for this view. Using a much more precise methodology, this paper shows that firms do retain managers when they reprice their options compared to when they do not.

Executive Stock Option Repricing: The Cost to Firms and Value to Executives

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
N.K. Chidambaran ◽  
Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala
Keyword(s):  
Stock Option ◽  
Executive Stock Option ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Option Repricing ◽  
Stock Option Repricing

Executive Stock Option Repricing: Retention and Performance Reconsidered

2002 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 8-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine M. Daily ◽  
S. Trevis Certo ◽  
Dan R. Dalton
Keyword(s):  
Stock Option ◽  
Executive Stock Option ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Option Repricing ◽  
Stock Option Repricing

Is executive stock option repricing a red flag?

2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 61-69
Author(s):  
Evelyn C. Hume ◽  
Damir Tokic
Keyword(s):  
Stock Option ◽  
Executive Stock Option ◽  
Red Flag ◽  
Option Repricing ◽  
Stock Option Repricing
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