Stock options: do they influence dividend payments?

Purpose This study aims to investigate whether there is any influence of the option plan to purchase shares protected from dividends to determine the distribution of dividends in Brazilian companies. Design/methodology/approach The authors used a Tobit dynamic and regressive regression model because their sample has an index higher than 30% of companies that do not pay dividends. The sample includes companies that pay dividends or not and pay their executives with executive stock option plans and is composed of 1,990 observations from 356 companies from 2010 to 2016. Findings The results indicated that the presence of a dividend protection clause has a positive association with the distribution of dividends. The authors sought to clarify that companies with a stock option plan protected by the distribution of dividends face fewer restrictions on the distribution of dividends. The authors found that most companies still use only stock options to benefit middle-ranking positions and fit the plan in their remuneration policy. The monitoring of these plans lasts an average of seven years, and specific acquisition conditions are not established with their beneficiaries, who must remain in the company and observe performance metrics. Originality/value This study is relevant because the relationship between dividends and stock options has not yet been analyzed in Brazil, especially concerning a dividend-protected option plan, which is a relatively recent modality, even unknown to some companies.

THE VALUE OF BEING LUCKY: OPTION BACKDATING AND NONDIVERSIFIABLE RISK

The practice of executives influencing their option compensation by setting a grant date retrospectively is known as backdating. Since executive stock options are usually granted at-the-money, selecting an advantageous grant date to coincide with a low stock price will be valuable to an executive. Empirical evidence shows that backdating of executive stock option grants was prevalent, particularly at firms with highly volatile stock prices. Executives who have the opportunity to backdate should take this into account in their valuation. We quantify the value to a risk averse executive of a lucky option grant with strike chosen to coincide with the lowest stock price of the month. We show the ex ante gain to risk averse executives from the ability to backdate increases with both risk aversion and with volatility, and is significant in magnitude. Our model involves valuing the embedded partial American lookback option in a utility indifference setting with key features of risk aversion, inability to diversify and early exercise.

BEHAVIORAL FACTORS OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT FOR EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION EXERCISE DECISIONS

Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menguji faktor-faktor keperilakuan eksekutif atas perilaku pengelolaan laba berkaitan dengan program penawaran opsi saham eksekutif pada perusahaan-perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Konsisten dengan Heath dan Huddart (1998) bahwa eksekusi terhadap opsi saham eksekutif merupakan respon terhadap pergerakan harga saham. Penelitian ini mengirim 75 kuesioner dan kembali sebanyak 52, tetapi 2 kuesioner tidak menjawab secara lengkap dan dikeluarkan sebagai sampel, sehingga sampel akhir sebanyak 50. Analisis data menggunakan regresi berganda terdiri atas 3 (tiga) variabel indepeden dan 1 variabel dependen. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa nilai opsi saham dan desain kompensasi menjadi faktor yang dipertimbangkan manajer untuk melakukan pengelolaan laba, namun tidak demikian untuk faktor pengukuran kinerja. Semakin besar nilai kompensasi yang diterima, semakin besar kemungkinan manajer melakukan pengelolaan laba. Sebagai tambahan, kompensasi jangka panjang menunjukkan desain penghargaan kepada para eksekutif yang memiliki kemampuan dan loyalitas yang tinggi, sehingga mengikat untuk jangka waktu panjang melalui opsi saham eksekutif. Hal tersebut semakin memotivasi eksekutif untuk meningkatkan kinerja mereka melalui pengelolan laba karena untung diperoleh dari perbedaan antara harga pasar pada saat jatuh tempo dengan harga eksekusi pada tanggal hibah.

EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION PLANS: UJI PENGELOLAAN LABA SELAMA VESTING PERIOD

This study examine earnings management behavior related to compensation in the form of stock options during implementation of the grant program (vesting period). The study also examine and identify the differences in behavior during the execution of stock options. Companies as a sample in this study is a company listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange, which has adopted the Executive Stock Option Plan and restricted to the companies that publish financial statements as of December 31 for the year 2007 to 2009. Final sample of this research into as many as 21 sample companies and the number of observations are 63 observational studies. The result of testing H1 shows that the more stock options offered to employees, the managers more motivated to manage earnings down prior to offering stock options. The results are consistent with previous studies of the behavior of managers who expect the share price decline before the date of grant, so the manager to pay compensation for stock options with a relatively cheap price. The results of testing H2a and H2b show that the more stock options offered to employees, the managers more motivated to manage earnings upward after offering stock options. Results show that an early stage implementation of executive stock option plans, executives trend to behave increasing income until vesting period final

The Effect of Shareholder Rights and Information Asymmetry on Stock-Option-Related Repurchase Activity

As stock-option holdings increase, managers alter their firms’ payout composition, choosing stock repurchases rather than dividends to return cash to shareholders. Prior research presents two competing explanations for this behavior: the flexibility hypothesis and the shareholder power hypothesis. In support of the flexibility hypothesis, I document that this executive stock-option incentive to repurchase stock as a substitute for dividends is stronger when firms have weak shareholder rights and when information asymmetry is severe. In addition, I find that option-induced repurchases are associated with lower shareholder wealth when shareholder rights are weak or when information asymmetry is high. These firms also perform worse in the following year but show higher total payouts to shareholders. Overall, this paper provides a comprehensive picture of managers’ option-driven repurchase behavior.