Purpose
This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem.
Design/methodology/approach
The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011.
Findings
In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem.
Originality/value
The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.
CEO Incentives, Takeover Protection and Corporate Innovation
