Bureaucratic, Professional and Managerial Power in University Tenure Track Recruitment

In this chapter, our interest lies in analysing the different powers in recruitment and, particularly, how they are manifested in the new tenure track model in technical fields in Finland. Traditionally, recruitment in higher education has mostly relied on the bureaucratic application of processes and on academics, representing professional power, evaluating academic merit. The new university legislation, granting universities more autonomy in recruiting, has allowed the development of increasingly strategic recruitment models. The novel tenure track recruitment criteria exceed traditional notions of individual merits to include assessments of the strategic visions of universities and departments. We see the use of the tenure track model as a shift both in the recruitment for identity building related to the technical university’s strategy and as a shift in using more managerial power in recruitment. We use a case study approach where we look at recruitment in a similar field in two different kinds of universities utilising tenure track, and we examine how bureaucratic, managerial and professional powers are manifested in the processes. The comparisons are used to highlight the powers in the tenure track process in a technical university.

АНАЛІЗ УПРАВЛІННЯ СОЦІАЛЬНО-ПСИХОЛОГІЧНОЮ ПІДСИСТЕМОЮ ТОВ «ЛУКМІ УКРАЇНА»

The article provides insights into the specifics and key management patterns related to the socio-psychological subsystem of a consulting company. According to current standards, the study offers an assessment on social responsibility of the consulting company along with suggesting argument on the need to implement socially responsible programs and activities to enhance the competitiveness of LUKMI UKRAINE Ltd consulting company. The hypothesis of the study is based on the statement that given the research results, tackling interpersonal relationships is critically important for the organization, since conflicts and misunderstandings between colleagues may translate into derailing of strategic planning and create barriers to attaining goals. Accordingly, a study of human behavior psychology will facilitate management regulation process which in turn might contribute to attaining better management performance and boost management effectiveness. The purpose of the research is to identify the role and significance of studying modern practices in managing a company socio-psychological subsystem in the context of the national economy development and the realia of structural and innovative transformations. To attain the research objectives, the following methods have been employed: dialectical, structural and systemic methods – to build a structural and logical model to ensure effective management of socio-psychological subsystem of the enterprise, historical and systemic approaches, methods of analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction techniques – to explore the conceptual paradigm of company management. The study presents the structure and the nature of the company socio-psychological subsystem and the specifics of its successful application to foster further business development and attaining its strategic objectives – financial, structural, etc. The research findings demonstrate that better understanding by management of the content and structural elements of the consulting company socio-psychological subsystem, and good managerial skills in harnessing socio-psychological management methods to implement their executive managerial power will contribute to enhancing the current practices of the consulting company in managing the socio-psychological subsystem.

The decline of authority and the rise of managerialism

Managerialism, as an ideology and management practice, is grounded on a theory of authority. Such grounding has been neglected in the relevant literature since scholars have generally treated authority as a form of power and have ignored the view that authority is also a source of power. Following a review of the construct of authority as it appears in the works of noted social psychologists and critical management authors, this essay argues that Carl Friedrich’s theory of authority as reasoned elaboration reveals two manifestations: authoritativeness and authoritarianism. It is argued here that managerialism draws on authoritarian ideas and practices, whereas management, as traditionally conceived, draws on authoritativeness. To promote authoritative management, therefore, is to resist (authoritarian) managerialism since authority redirects power to technical experts and professional colleagues and thereby limits managerial power.

Corporate governance issues surrounding executive compensation and executive severance

This paper seeks to explain why and how executive severances of publicly-traded Canadian and U.S. companies have reached the financial levels they have, generating public and shareholder outrage and causing governments on both sides of the border to introduce new legislation. The paper investigates the role of the CEO, boards and shareholders in the setting of executive compensation. As the origins ofthe three roles lie in business corporation law, the legislative framework of Canadian and U.S. companies is presented to permit the reader to understand the legal accountabilities and rights of each of the three parties. The paper identifies that executives may exercise substantial influence over boards, possibly impeding effective governance. The paper concludes that effective governance, including greater board independence and board competence in executive compensation matters will help to improve board functioning and minimize the effects of the agency problem, cronyism and managerial power.

Corporate governance issues surrounding executive compensation and executive severance

This paper seeks to explain why and how executive severances of publicly-traded Canadian and U.S. companies have reached the financial levels they have, generating public and shareholder outrage and causing governments on both sides of the border to introduce new legislation. The paper investigates the role of the CEO, boards and shareholders in the setting of executive compensation. As the origins ofthe three roles lie in business corporation law, the legislative framework of Canadian and U.S. companies is presented to permit the reader to understand the legal accountabilities and rights of each of the three parties. The paper identifies that executives may exercise substantial influence over boards, possibly impeding effective governance. The paper concludes that effective governance, including greater board independence and board competence in executive compensation matters will help to improve board functioning and minimize the effects of the agency problem, cronyism and managerial power.

The determinants of CEO compensation: new insights from United States

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of CEO compensation for sample of the US firms. It emphasizes the presence of executive compensation persistence and the importance of CEO power besides performance while setting CEO pay.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of US firms during the period 2006–2016. It is based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) models to assess the impact of numerous factors on CEO compensation.FindingsThe main findings reveal that firm performance proxied by accounting-based proxies, as well as market-based proxies, plays a significant role in explaining variations in levels of executive compensation. Moreover, there is a significant persistence in executive compensation among the US sample firms. The authors also document that poor governance conditions (managerial power hypothesis) lead to high compensation levels offered to CEO.Research limitations/implicationsAt the end, without a doubt, the analysis has some limitations that prompt the authors to consider future research directions. One future research avenue that can help better explain the effect of firm performance on the CEO compensation is to study this issue using an international sample to determine whether country-level characteristics (e.g. creditor rights, shareholder rights and the enforcement climate) can influence this relationship. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to deepen the analysis of CEO power and its impact on CEO compensation. It will be interesting to emphasize how the CEO power interacts with the other governance characteristics and some CEO attributes as CEO gender.Practical implicationsThe paper's findings have implications for practitioners, policymakers and regulatory authorities. First, the findings inform regulators that performance is not the only determinant of CEO pay level. This may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure. Second, the study offers insights to policymakers and members of boards of directors interested in enhancing the design of executive compensation and internal corporate governance, to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Firms should strengthen the board independence and properly constitute the board committees (compensation, risk, nomination…).Originality/valueThis paper presents a comprehensive overview of the CEO compensation determinants. It supplements the classic pay-for-performance sensitivity predictions with insights gained from the dynamics of wage setting theory and managerial power theory. The authors develop a composite index to measure the CEO power in order to test the impact of CEO attributes on CEO pay. Additionally, it verifies whether the determinants of CEO pay depend on firm age and size.