scholarly journals Private Information Revelation in Common-Value Auctions

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vlad N. Mares ◽  
Ronald M. Harstad
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Common Value Auctions

scholarly journals Private information revelation in common-value auctions

2003 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 264-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vlad Mares ◽  
Ronald M. Harstad
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Common Value Auctions

Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Ziegler ◽  
Theo Offerman ◽  
GIORGIA Romagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Information Revelation ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Common Value Auctions ◽  
Endogenous Information

Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Ziegler ◽  
Theo Offerman ◽  
GIORGIA Romagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Information Revelation ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Common Value Auctions ◽  
Endogenous Information

Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Ziegler ◽  
Theo Offerman ◽  
GIORGIA Romagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Information Revelation ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Common Value Auctions ◽  
Endogenous Information

scholarly journals Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices

Econometrica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (5) ◽  
pp. 2049-2079
Author(s):  
Alp E. Atakan ◽  
Mehmet Ekmekci
Keyword(s):  
Information Content ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Reserve Price ◽  
Market Selection ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Common Value Auctions ◽  
Price Auction

We study information aggregation when n bidders choose, based on their private information, between two concurrent common‐value auctions. There are k s identical objects on sale through a uniform‐price auction in market s and there are an additional k r objects on auction in market r, which is identical to market s except for a positive reserve price. The reserve price in market r implies that information is not aggregated in this market. Moreover, if the object‐to‐bidder ratio in market s exceeds a certain cutoff, then information is not aggregated in market s either. Conversely, if the object‐to‐bidder ratio is less than this cutoff, then information is aggregated in market s as the market grows arbitrarily large. Our results demonstrate how frictions in one market can disrupt information aggregation in a linked, frictionless market because of the pattern of market selection by imperfectly informed bidders.

Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Ziegler ◽  
Theo Offerman ◽  
GIORGIA Romagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Information Revelation ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Common Value Auctions ◽  
Endogenous Information

Common-value auctions with discrete private information

1991 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruqu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Common Value Auctions

Common Value Auctions with Asymmetric Bidder Information

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priyodorshi Banerjee
Keyword(s):  
Common Value ◽  
Common Value Auctions

Bidding in First Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions: A Computational Approach

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulo Fagandini ◽  
Ingemar Dierickx
Keyword(s):  
Computational Approach ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Common Value Auctions
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