Social Media Marketing, Quality Signaling, and the Goldilocks Principle

Embraced by a rapidly increasing number of companies, social media marketing has become an integral part of companies' business strategies. However, not all the firms plan on a big spend on social media marketing. Our stylized model investigates the strategic effects of social media marketing spending (SMM spending) with the presence of exogenous quality revelation through sources over which firms have no direct control. Unlike traditional advertising, social media marketing has two roles: awareness enhancement and information revelation. Consumers are heterogeneous in their awareness of the product (e.g., whether they know the existence of the product). Our results suggest that the high-quality firm gets enough quality transparency from background user-generated discussions, and the cost of maintaining a social presence outweighs the benefits. The low-quality firm avoids social media marketing because quality transparency is broadly detrimental, whereas the mid-tier firm is “just right” to benefit from social media discussions they encourage. Our model provides a first step toward framing social media marketing spending as a strategic investment. We recognize that social media marketing, although capable of increasing consumer awareness and improving the realized perceptions of a firm's true quality, also has strategic signaling effects.

The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations: A theory of treatymaking

States negotiate over the specific terms of multilateral treaties because those terms determine states’ willingness to ratify the treaty. In some cases, a state might decline to ratify a treaty it otherwise supports because specific terms are too far from those it prefers. States and inter-governmental organizations negotiating treaties would like to uncover the minimal terms needed to secure the ratification of key states, but under what circumstances will those states candidly reveal those terms? Using a spatial representation of the issues in a treaty negotiation, we use mechanism design to determine what information states will reveal in a treaty negotiation. We find that states are willing to reveal how they would like tradeoffs between different issues to be resolved but not the minimal terms they require for ratification. Further, negotiations cannot always separate types that need concessions to ratify from other types that would like concessions but would ratify the treaty even if they do not receive them. These findings provide insight into how treaty negotiations can succeed or fail, and they lay the theoretical groundwork for a new line of empirical research on how multilateral treaties are negotiated.

How success breeds success

We investigate if, and why, an initial success can trigger a string of successes. Using random variations in success in a real-effort laboratory experiment, we cleanly identify the causal effect of an early success in a competition. We confirm that an early success indeed leads to increased chances of a later success. By alternatively eliminating strategic features of the competition, we turn on and off possible mechanisms driving the effect of an early success. Standard models of dynamic contest predict a strategic effect due to asymmetric incentives between initial winners and losers. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that they can explain the positive effect of winning. Instead, we find that the effect of winning seems driven by an information revelation effect, whereby players update their beliefs about their relative strength after experiencing an initial success.

Efficient Model for Privacy Preserving Classification Of Data Streams

Privacy preserving data mining has become progressively mainstream since it permits sharing of privacy delicate data for examination purposes .So individuals have gotten progressively reluctant to share their data, regularly bringing about people either declining to share their data or giving inaccurate data. As of late, privacy preserving data mining has been concentrated broadly, on account of the wide multiplication of delicate data on the web. Data Mining manages programmed extraction of already obscure examples from a lot of data sets. These data sets ordinarily contain touchy individual data or basic business data, which thusly get presented to different gatherings during Data Mining exercises. This makes hindrance in Data Mining measure. Answer for this issue is given by Privacy preserving in data mining (PPDM). PPDM is a specific arrangement of Data Mining exercises where procedures are developed to secure privacy of the data, so the information revelation cycle can be completed without obstruction. The target of PPDM is to shield delicate data from spilling in the mining cycle alongside exact Data Mining results. The objective of this paper is to introduce the survey on different privacy preserving strategies which are useful in mining huge measure of data with sensible productivity and security.

Sequential persuasion

This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce informativeness in equilibrium and results in a more informative equilibrium in the case of two states. Moreover, with the exception of the first sender, it is without loss of generality to let each sender move only once. Sequential persuasion cannot generate a more informative equilibrium than simultaneous persuasion and is always less informative when there are only two states.