scholarly journals Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gyula Seres
2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (03) ◽  
pp. 395-403
Author(s):  
WINSTON T.H. KOH

In this paper, I extend the analysis in Koh (2006) to examine the optimality of inter-temporal price discrimination for a durable-good monopoly in a model where infinitely-lived households consume both durable goods and a stream of non-durable goods subject to different inter-temporal budget constraints. I also consider the multi-dimensional setting where households differ in both inter-temporal budget constraints and the utilities they derive from the consumption of the durable good.


2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 876-884 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changying Li ◽  
Xiaoyan Geng

1996 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry S. Karp ◽  
Jeffrey M. Perloff

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 497-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard F. Hartl ◽  
Peter M. Kort ◽  
Andrea Seidl

Abstract The aim of the present paper is to analyze how firms that sell durable goods should optimally combine continuous-time operational level planning with discrete decision making. In particular, a firm has to continuously adapt its capacity investments and sales strategy, but only at certain times it will introduce a new version of the durable good to the market. The launch of a new generation of the product attracts new customers. However, in order to be able to produce the new version, production facilities need to be adapted leading to a decrease of available production capacities. We find that the price of a given generation of a product decreases over time. A firm should increase its production capacity most upon introduction of a new product. The stock of potential consumers is largest then so that the market is most profitable. The extent to which existing capacity can still be used in the production process for the next generation has a non-monotonic effect on the time when a new version of the product is introduced as well as on the capital stock level at that time.


2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Fishman ◽  
Rafael Rob

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