A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria

Author(s):  
Francesco De Sinopoli ◽  
Giovanna Iannantuoni

2006 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco De Sinopoli ◽  
Giovanna Iannantuoni


1997 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Kollman ◽  
John H. Miller ◽  
Scott E. Page


2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 650-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Henry ◽  
Ismael Mourifié




2007 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gyung-Ho Jeong

This paper develops a procedure for locating proposals and legislators in a multidimensional policy space by applying agenda-constrained ideal point estimation. Placing proposals and legislators on the same scale allows an empirical test of the predictions of the spatial voting model. I illustrate this procedure by testing the predictive power of the uncovered set—a solution concept of the multidimensional spatial voting model—using roll call data from the U.S. Senate. Since empirical tests of the predictive power of the uncovered set have been limited to experimental data, this is the first empirical test of the concept's predictive power using real-world data.





Author(s):  
James Adams ◽  
Samuel Merrill ◽  
Roi Zur


2020 ◽  
Vol 174 ◽  
pp. 360-379
Author(s):  
Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde ◽  
João V. Ferreira


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document