scholarly journals Endogenous Internet Structure and Bargaining Power in Interconnection Agreements

2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tackseung Jun ◽  
Jeong-Yoo Kim ◽  
Hee-Su Kim
Keyword(s):  
Betweenness Centrality ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Network Formation ◽  
Formation Model ◽  
Myerson Value ◽  
Bargaining Outcome ◽  
Stable Network

We consider a model of Internet interconnection. We characterize the Myerson value as the bargaining outcome in interconnection agreements in given networks and provide its interpretation in terms of "betweenness centrality." Then, in an extended network formation model, we characterize the structures of the efficient network and the stable network and confirm the disparity between them. We also identify the condition for the disparity to disappear under bill-and-keep agreements. The possibility of multi-homing and secondary peering is briefly discussed.

How Farsightedness Affects Network Formation

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominik Morbitzer ◽  
Vincent Buskens ◽  
Stephanie Rosenkranz ◽  
Werner Raub
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Network Formation ◽  
Macro Level ◽  
Network Structures ◽  
Formation Model ◽  
Micro Foundations ◽  
Stable Network

AbstractWe develop a theoretical model of network formation where actors are limitedly farsighted. In this way we extend current models with a new set of micro-foundations. Computer simulations are used to predict the stable network structures that are likely to emerge under the new assumptions. The co-author model by Jackson/Wolinsky (1996) is used as an example. The co-author model formulates a tension between stability and efficiency when actors are myopic. Limitedly farsighted actors can overcome this tension but only if the network is small enough. Thus, changing the micro-foundations of the network formation model leads to new implications at the macro-level in the sense that different networks are predicted to be stable than for existing micro-foundations.

scholarly journals Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 134-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffry Frieden ◽  
Stefanie Walter
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Bargaining Outcome ◽  
Ideal Points ◽  
Political Conditions

Analyzing international negotiations among the member states of the European Union raises a number of analytical issues, especially in unusual circumstances such as the Eurozone crisis. Our article discusses these issues in the light of existing theory and informed by the empirical analyses assembled in this special issue. ‘National preferences’ or ideal points of the governments involved are driven by their domestic socio-economic and political conditions and institutions, the dimensionality of the negotiations, and strategic considerations. We then discuss how national preferences, states’ bargaining power, the strategic and institutional bargaining context, and the bargaining dynamics jointly influence the bargaining outcome. Examples from European negotiations in the context of the Eurozone crisis illustrate both the complexity of the process and the value of serious, theoretically informed, empirical analysis.

Analysis and Interventions in Large Network Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Parise ◽  
Asuman Ozdaglar
Keyword(s):  
Network Formation ◽  
Autonomous Systems ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
Publication Date ◽  
Stochastic Network ◽  
Large Network ◽  
Formation Model ◽  
Efficient Manner ◽  
Network Games

We review classic results and recent progress on equilibrium analysis, dynamics, and optimal interventions in network games with both continuous and discrete strategy sets. We study strategic interactions in deterministic networks as well as networks generated from a stochastic network formation model. For the former case, we review a unifying framework for analysis based on the theory of variational inequalities. For the latter case, we highlight how knowledge of the stochastic network formation model can be used by a central planner to design interventions for large networks in a computationally efficient manner when exact network data are not available. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems, Volume 4 is May 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

Social Clubs and Social Networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 224-251
Author(s):  
Chaim Fershtman ◽  
Dotan Persitz
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Network Formation ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Formation Model ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Weighted Network ◽  
Social Clubs ◽  
Model Based

We present a strategic network formation model based on membership in clubs. Individuals choose affiliations. The set of all memberships induces a weighted network where two individuals are directly connected if they share a club. Two individuals may also be indirectly connected using multiple memberships of third parties. Individuals gain from their position in the induced network and pay membership fees. We study the club congestion model where the weight of a link decreases with the size of the smallest shared club. A trade-off emerges between the size of clubs, the depreciation of indirect connections, and the membership fee. (JEL D71, D85, Z13)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document