scholarly journals Hands, screws, triangles and absolute space

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-302
Author(s):  
Nenad Filipovic

Hands and other incongruent counterparts are enough argument against relationist, at least Kant thought so, since some of his pre-critical writings. Arguments with incongruent counterparts are elegant and effective and they are quite attracted great attention of numerous authors who have criticized or defended the arguments in different ways. In a meanwhile discussions have gone too far from Kant's original argument, and from the spirit of that time, and received characteristics of modern philosophy and geometry. This text should show that Kant, as well as those who later defended him, did not achieve their goal - no conclusive argument against relationist have been brought by them.

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Rukgaber

AbstractI propose that we interpret Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts in the 1768 article ‘Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space’ in light of a theory of dynamic absolute space that he accepted throughout the 1750s and 1760s. This force-based or material conception of space was not an unusual interpretation of the Newtonian notion of absolute space. Nevertheless, commentators have continually argued that Kant’s argument is an utter failure that shifts from the metaphysics of space to its epistemology, because he has no way to connect ‘directionality’ and ‘handedness’ to absolute space. This supposed failure is based on an understanding of absolute space in purely mathematical terms and as an absolute void that lacks any qualitative or dynamic features. If we recognize that Kant held that space had an intrinsic directional asymmetry then his argument successfully connects incongruent counterparts to absolute space. The presence of this notion in Kant’s pre-Critical thought is rarely noted, and its necessity in understanding his incongruence argument is novel.


2005 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 30-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rogério Passos Severo

In recent times, a number of authors have systematically criticized Kant's 1768 ‘proof’ of the reality of absolute space. Peter Remnant may have been the first do to so, but many others have since joined him, either challenging the argument itself or showing how relationist conceptions of space can account for incongruent counterparts just as well as absolutist conceptions. In fact, Kant himself abandoned his main conclusion soon after publication, favouring instead the doctrine of transcendental idealism. I do not see how the 1768 proof can be saved, nor will I defend it here. However, in dismissing it some critics seem to have gone too far, and either failed to fully acknowledge Kant's contribution, or attributed to him thoughts he is unlikely to have had. Kant's treatment of incongruent counterparts in his Dissertation of 1770 has also met strong opposition. In particular, his claim that the difference between a pair of incongruent counterparts cannot be apprehended by means of concepts alone has been taken to be a mathematical falsehood. Indeed, incongruent counterparts have been shown to be mathematically distinguishable, with no intuitions needed for that purpose.


Author(s):  
Michela Massimi

This chapter assesses Newton’s legacy for Kant by concentrating on the evolution of Kant’s view of space in the pre-Critical period (1748–1768), with two main goals in mind. The first goal is to draw attention to the role that Newton’s matter theory and chemistry played for the young Kant. The second is to argue against the received view that has portrayed the young Kant as embracing Newton’s absolute space in 1768 via the argument from incongruent counterparts (short-lived as this conversion to Newton’s absolute space proved to be). By contrast to the received view, this chapter shows that in the period 1748–1768, Kant was working with a thoroughgoing relationalism, consonant with Kant’s matter theory, which was, in turn, inspired by speculative Newtonian experimentalism itself. Hence, the case is made for a slightly different interpretive stance on Newton’s legacy for the young Kant.


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