Evil: the experience of philosophical research

The monograph is devoted to a holistic consideration of the phenomenon of evil. It examines and analyzes philosophical ideas about the nature of evil, which can be found among outstanding thinkers. The figure of the Devil as the main antagonist of God, the "fallen angel" and the progenitor of evil is studied. The main and, in the author's opinion, the most important types and modes of evil, such as hatred, meanness, betrayal, crime, etc., are analyzed. Designed for everyone interested in the problems of modern philosophy, cultural studies and ethics.

Editorial: E. J. Lowe’s Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology

Edward Jonathan Lowe was one of the most distinguished metaphysicians of the last 50 plus years. He made immense contributions to analytic philosophy in as diverse areas as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, history of Modern philosophy (especially on John Locke), and philosophy of religion

At War in Swaddling Clothes: Stirner’s Unique One as a Conative Existence

In its simplest and primary sense, conatus is about self-preservation. It further involves the obligation, the duty, the imperative even, deriving from the Law of Nature for man to do whatever within his power to maintain his life. Even though this idea has been an old one, it was reintroduced in a more sophisticated form by modern philosophy as no longer a cruel necessity of life but ontologically tied to Reason and Natural law. It was with Hobbes that the idea of self-preservation was put at the core of his anthropological narration (with well known political connotations) and with Spinoza that conatus was delved into within his ontological universe. Regardless of their ontological starting points, both philosophers ended up eventually in a resolution with regard to that primary anthropological tension between individuals, whether this was a common legislator, the political society or the state. Somewhat radical at the beginning, Hobbes and Spinoza had to make some mitigations in order to arrive at a resolution. Yet, that was not Stirner’s case. On the contrary, Stirner’s opening ontological statement was rather too extreme and inconceivable even: it is also the newborn child that gets to war with the world and not only the other way around. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that this extreme trailhead leads the Stirnerian egoist to his fulfillment as the Unique One through ownership and that this agonistic tremendous striving constitutes the Stirnerian notion of conatus. That notion offers no resolution to the ontological animosity between individuals; on the contrary, that animosity is required as ontological precondition and prefiguration of conatus' conclusion as well.

Dualism and Buddhism. Parallels and Points of Convergence with Neuroscience

The article is devoted to one of the most relevant problems of modern philosophy, the philosophy of consciousness in light of the latest discoveries of neurobiology. The most poorly studied aspects; the problem of free will, the problem of consciousness of the animal world and the problem of psychophysical parallelism are considered in this article. Some ethical and ideological issues related to the problems are also considered. The classic dispute about the nature of consciousness by E.V. Ilyenkov and D.I. Dubrovsky, which ended essentially in a stalemate precisely because of the ignorance of the importance of the above issues, is considered as an example of why these questions are relevant. The article also views the paradox of free will and responsibility for one's actions, which inevitably arises with a materialistic understanding of the nature of consciousness. The article briefly analyzes the key ideas for this topic by a number of prominent neuroscientists (Wilder Penfield, John Eccles, Oleg Kryshtal (Krishtal), Christoph Koch), devoted to the problem of the nature of consciousness in the time from the 1970s to the present, as well as the philosophical foundations of ideas about consciousness, formed in the European philosophy of modern times. The concept of dualism and its possible foundations, which are relevant at the present time, are examined separately, but the dualistic concept of consciousness proposed by Descartes is criticized as incompatible with the modern conclusions of neurobiology. Also, the evidence of world-renowned neuroscientists destroying the "human monopoly" on the possession of consciousness and indicating the presence of consciousness in the animal kingdom is presented. Ultimately, the philosophy of Buddhism is considered as one of the possible and most promising topics for studying in this direction. The strengths of the Buddhist concept of consciousness, which are hardly noticeable in this time, are summarized, thus giving an advantage over the ontological foundations of the concept of consciousness that prevailed in Europe in the modern era. In general, the convergence of traditional Buddhist views on the nature of consciousness with the latest achievements of neurobiology is noted.

Introduction

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the study of the history of philosophy. In general, there is an enormous difference between those who concern themselves with ancient philosophy, those who concern themselves with medieval philosophy, and the students of the history of modern philosophy. And, across this distinction, there is a great variety of approaches. One should not forget that the historiography of philosophy itself in many ways is a product of history and reflects the historical context in which it is pursued. Nevertheless, what this book is interested in is not the factual question of why historians of philosophy do what they do, but the theoretical question, the question of how one ought to conceive of and explain what they do; though they themselves in this work may not in fact be guided by these assumptions and principles, there must be such principles to the extent that their activity is a rational activity. It is also important to note that philosophers tend to criticize historians of philosophy as being unduly historical and not sufficiently philosophical.

The Identification and Representation of Views

This chapter describes the actual work of the historian of philosophy. Ordinarily, the historian is working with a text, or even a number of texts, on the basis of which he will try to reconstruct the thought of a philosopher. This is the standard case in the history of medieval philosophy, and it is almost invariably the case for the historian of modern philosophy. In the case of ancient philosophy, however, the primary aim is not to understand certain texts, but to understand the thought of a philosopher underlying a text, if there is one. The historian has to understand and to explain a philosopher’s taking a view from the point of view of a contemporary historian of philosophy, and this means that he has to identify——to represent——the philosopher’s view not only in terms in which it is intelligible to a modern historian of philosophy, but also in terms in which it is intelligible to the historian’s modern audience. And this raises at least two questions, one concerning the translation this involves and the other concerning the language of the historian.

Hermeneutics of Aristotle and Hermeneutics of Sophists in Terms of Dialogue Philosophy. Part II. From Sophists to Modernity

The article considers the logical and philosophical doctrine of sophists, which, according to some modern researchers, was more philosophical than their ancient critics recognized. A comparison of the provisions of Aristotle's hermeneutics with preserved fragments of Protagoras and Gorgias shows that the doctrine of sophists was a kind of holistic philosophy, which anticipated the philosophy of dialogue of the XX century. Despite the fact that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle tried to overcome the relativism and anti-ontologism of the doctrine of sophists, some elements of its dialogism were preserved in subsequent philosophy in dialectics and rhetoric. The first thing you should pay attention to is the difference between the dialogical form of the presentation of philosophy in Plato and dialogue as the fundamental basis of thinking that we find among sophists. The dialogism preserved in the dialectic of Plato and the rhetoric of Aristotle is more a technical method of convincing the interlocutor than a hermeneutical basis, which it is in the philosophy of dialogue and in the method of Socratic discussion. The linguistic turn that occurred in the philosophy of the 20th century includes not only an increased interest in language and accuracy of expression. No less important is the new formulation of the question of the nature of the language. Is language a tool for the formulation of thought as Aristotle believed and followed by representatives of modern analytical philosophy, or does it have its own fundamental status, as representatives of the philosophy of dialogue believe? In this context, it is very important for the philosophy of dialogue to find in the thinking of the pre-Socratics those predecessors who already charted the paths for modern thought two and a half thousand years ago. The second part of the article discusses the forms of the dialogic thinking that have survived in philosophy after the sophists and the role of the sophists' hermeneutics in the formation of modern philosophy of dialogue.