Leibniz and Kant

Although it is common to see Kant’s philosophy as at its core a reaction to (and partial rejection of) the dogmatism and rationalism of Leibniz, Wolff and their followers, it is surprising how little detailed and critical study there has been of the relation between Leibniz and Kant. How did Kant understand Leibniz’s philosophy? Did he correctly understand Leibniz’s philosophy? Since only a portion of Leibniz’s philosophical writings were published prior to Kant’s Critical period, is there a “true Leibniz” that Kant did not know? Are all of Kant’s criticisms of Leibniz in particular and Leibnizian rationalism in general justified? Or does Leibniz have an answer to Kant’s philosophy? Moreover, how should we understand the reception of Leibniz’s philosophy in eighteenth-century Enlightenment Germany? This book seeks to examine the relation between Leibniz and Kant by collecting essays written by some of the leading scholars of the history of modern philosophy, all of whom have in common a deep knowledge of both these two philosophers. This anthology further aims to create a dialogue between scholars of early modern philosophy and Kantians and to fill a lacuna in historical and philosophical scholarship. The essays contained here address fundamental questions of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology in Leibniz and Kant and address Kant’s understanding and interpretation of his philosophical predecessor.

The World Soul in Early Modern Philosophy

The world soul was often a target of attack in early modern natural philosophy, on grounds of impiety and explanatory vacuity. But it also played an important role in debates about two of the most important questions in natural philosophy: How does nature depend on God, and what explains nature’s organization? As an answer to those questions, it lived on through the early modern period, sustained especially by philosophers who argued that individuals in nature cannot be understood in isolation from the whole. In this chapter it is argued that in this guise, it served as an alternative model of explanation in a context that increasingly emphasized explanation in terms of laws of nature, and that this reflects the fact that these two models represent two fundamentally competing approaches to natural philosophical explanation.

Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume X

Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy is an annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of early modern philosophy. It focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the extraordinary period of intellectual flourishing that begins, roughly, with Descartes and his contemporaries and ends with Kant. It also publishes work on thinkers or movements outside of that framework, provided they are important in illuminating early modern thought. The core of the subject matter is philosophy and its history. But the volume’s chapters reflect the fact that philosophy in the early modern period was much broader in its scope than it is currently taken to be and included a great deal of what now belongs to the natural sciences. Furthermore, philosophy in the period was closely connected with other disciplines, such as theology, law and medicine, and with larger questions of social, political, and religious history. Volume 10 includes chapters dedicated to a wide set of topics in the philosophies of Thomas White, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, and Hume.

Feminism and Early Modern Philosophy

This chapter offers an account of the history and central issues in feminist philosophical engagements with early modern philosophy. The chapter describes a “first wave” of feminist scholarship on early modern philosophy, beginning around the 1990s, that involved examining the work of canonical male philosophers from a feminist perspective, as well as a “second wave” that focuses on the early modern women philosophers themselves. Projects involved in this second wave include (1) explaining why and how these works dropped out of view in the first place; (2) finding, editing, translating (when necessary), and publishing neglected or lost writings; (3) contextualizing, analyzing, and critiquing these works; and (4) theorizing about and experimenting with ways to integrate these works into narratives of the history of philosophy. The chapter ends with discussion of an emerging “third wave” of opportunities for publishing, presenting at conferences, and teaching about these women philosophers.

George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy

This book focuses on how, for Berkeley, mind is related to its ideas. It does not assume that thinkers like Descartes, Malebranche, or Locke define for Berkeley the context in which he develops his own thought. Instead, it indicates how he draws on a tradition that informed his early training and that challenges much of the early modern thought with which he is often associated. Specifically, this book indicates how Berkeley’s distinctive treatment of mind (as the activity whereby objects are differentiated and related to one another) highlights how mind neither precedes the existence of objects nor exists independently of them. This distinctive way of understanding the relation of mind and objects allows Berkeley to appropriate ideas from his contemporaries in ways that so transform the issues with which he is engaged that his insights—for example, about how God creates the minds that perceive objects—are only now starting to be fully appreciated.