Deontic Paradox and Conditional Obligation

1989 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 107 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Tomberlin
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation

Conditional Obligation

1974 ◽  
pp. 23-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian F. Chellas
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation

scholarly journals Supererogation and conditional obligation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Muñoz ◽  
Theron Pummer
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation ◽  
General Account

AbstractThere are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons.

The Robbery Paradox

Dialogue ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-440
Author(s):  
Mark Vorobej
Keyword(s):  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Conditional Obligation ◽  
Proper Formulation ◽  
Deontic Paradoxes

James E. Tomberlin [6] has recently argued that the logical systems of conditional obligation proposed by Azizah al-Hibri [1] and Peter Mott [5] are incapable of resolving at least one variant of the notorious contrary to duty imperative paradox, formulated originally by Chisholm [2]. Tomberlin concedes that these systems offer the very best of the' “conditional obligation approach” to deontic logic and concludes his critical discussion with the pessimistic remark that “the best of this approach is simply not good enough. Deontic logic … is obliged to turn elsewhere for its proper formulation and resolution of the deontic paradoxes” ([6], 373). Below I argue that Tomberlin's three central arguments against al-Hibri and Mott are fallacious.

Chellas on conditional obligation

1983 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bonevac
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation

The logic of conditional obligation

1972 ◽  
Vol 1 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 417-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bas C. Van Fraassen
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation

Against Conditional Obligation

Noûs ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bonevac
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation

Conditional Obligation and Detachment*

1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark I. Vorobej
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Conditional Obligation ◽  
Stop Smoking ◽  
Recent Developments

Suppose that John has a moral obligation to stop smoking given that smoking is dangerous to his health. Suppose further that smoking is dangerous to his health. Does it follow that John has a moral obligation to stop smoking? Although intuition inclines one to answer in the affirmative, recent developments in deontic logic apparently call this inference into question. The issue at hand is whether unconditional obligations are detachable from conditional obligations on the basis of purely factual considerations. I believe that they are not. In the course of arguing for this position I defend a novel restricted rule of detachment which is constructed out of both factual and normative components.

Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Conditional Obligation

Noûs ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 357 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Tomberlin
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation

THE TWO PUZZLES ABOUT CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION

1987 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson ◽  
Robert Pargetter
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation
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