Deontic Paradox and Conditional Obligation

1989 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 107 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Tomberlin

Author(s):  
Brian F. Chellas


Author(s):  
Daniel Muñoz ◽  
Theron Pummer

AbstractThere are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons.



Dialogue ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-440
Author(s):  
Mark Vorobej

James E. Tomberlin [6] has recently argued that the logical systems of conditional obligation proposed by Azizah al-Hibri [1] and Peter Mott [5] are incapable of resolving at least one variant of the notorious contrary to duty imperative paradox, formulated originally by Chisholm [2]. Tomberlin concedes that these systems offer the very best of the' “conditional obligation approach” to deontic logic and concludes his critical discussion with the pessimistic remark that “the best of this approach is simply not good enough. Deontic logic … is obliged to turn elsewhere for its proper formulation and resolution of the deontic paradoxes” ([6], 373). Below I argue that Tomberlin's three central arguments against al-Hibri and Mott are fallacious.



1983 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bonevac


1972 ◽  
Vol 1 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 417-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bas C. Van Fraassen


Noûs ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bonevac


1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark I. Vorobej

Suppose that John has a moral obligation to stop smoking given that smoking is dangerous to his health. Suppose further that smoking is dangerous to his health. Does it follow that John has a moral obligation to stop smoking? Although intuition inclines one to answer in the affirmative, recent developments in deontic logic apparently call this inference into question. The issue at hand is whether unconditional obligations are detachable from conditional obligations on the basis of purely factual considerations. I believe that they are not. In the course of arguing for this position I defend a novel restricted rule of detachment which is constructed out of both factual and normative components.



Noûs ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 357 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Tomberlin


1987 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson ◽  
Robert Pargetter


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document