Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant's Transcendental Deduction.

1991 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 929
Author(s):  
Ralf Meerbote ◽  
Richard E. Aquila
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Deduction

Epilogue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Henning
Keyword(s):  
Historical Context ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction

This brief chapter summarizes central findings regarding the role of parenthetical sentences in practical discourse. But it also provides historical context. It suggests that a precursor of parentheticalism may be found in Kant, especially in Kant’s views about the “I think,” especially as they are expressed in the B-Version of the “Transcendental Deduction” and the B-Version of the chapter on Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Structural Description ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
The World ◽  
Empirical Realism

This chapter presents a straightforward structural description of Immanuel Kant’s conception of what the transcendental deduction is supposed to do, and how it is supposed to do it. The ‘deduction’ Kant thinks is needed for understanding the human mind would establish and explain our ‘right’ or ‘entitlement’ to something we seem to possess and employ in ‘the highly complicated web of human knowledge’. This is: experience, concepts, and principles. The chapter explains the point and strategy of the ‘deduction’ as Kant understands it, as well as the demanding conditions of its success, without entering into complexities of interpretation or critical assessment of the degree of success actually achieved. It also analyses Kant’s arguments regarding a priori concepts as well as a posteriori knowledge of the world around us, along with his claim that our position in the world must be understood as ‘empirical realism’.

Das Recht in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-149
Author(s):  
Reinhard Brandt
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Introductory Note ◽  
Pure Intuition

AbstractRecent publications (Henrich, Seeberg) claim that Kant has been profoundly influenced by contemporary publications on juridical deductions. I try to show, that this cannot be right. The introductory note of the “Transcendental Deduction” (Critique of Pure Reason A 84) poses two questions: “quid facti?” and “quid juris?”. The first is answered by the demonstration of the possibility of relations between pure concepts and pure intuition und sensations, the second by the implicit refutation of David Hume. Kant and his interpreters sustain the possibility of using juridical concepts, that are neither related to real juridical facts nor are only metaphers, but have a special philosophical signification. But what should that be?

III.—IS THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION A PATCHWORK?

Mind ◽  
1930 ◽  
Vol XXXIX (155) ◽  
pp. 318-331
Author(s):  
B. LUND YATES
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Deduction

scholarly journals Cogito, ergo est cogitabile. Cogitabile est, ergo cogito

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Rudolf Meer
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Realistic Interpretation ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Philosophical Criticism ◽  
Critical Project

Over the last two decades, the controversy between conceptualists and nonconceptualists has provided important insights into Kant’s critical project and especially the transcendental deduction. At the same time, the differentiation of the various positions has led to a seemingly unsolvable paradox in interpretation. However, if the intensifications of the debate are withdrawn and the current positions are placed in the context of historical interpretations, it becomes apparent that a nonconceptualism can indeed be developed without coming into (irresolvable) conflict with Kant’s conceptualism. In this sense, Alois Riehl proposes in his Philosophical Criticism (vol. 1) a so-called state nonconceptualism. Even if he does not have the terminology in use today, he can defend this on par with the current debate especially with regard to A 89–90 / B 122–123. In doing so, Riehl’s realistic interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism offers strategies that again question a hasty skepticism towards nonconceptualist interpretations.

The Pittsburgh Kantians: Brandom, Conant, Haugeland, and McDowell on Kant

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Jacob Browning
Keyword(s):  
Shared Reading ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
University Of Pittsburgh ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
The World ◽  
Novel Reading ◽  
John Haugeland ◽  
The University

Abstract Over the last thirty years, a group of philosophers associated with the University of Pittsburgh—Robert Brandom, James Conant, John Haugeland, and John McDowell—have developed a novel reading of Kant. Their interest turns on Kant’s problem of objective purport: how can my thoughts be about the world? This paper summarizes the shared reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction by these four philosophers and how it solves the problem of objective purport. But I also show these philosophers radically diverge in how they view Kant’s relevance for contemporary philosophy. I highlight an important distinction between those that hold a quietist response to Kant, evident in Conant and McDowell, and those that hold a constructive response, evident in Brandom and Haugeland. The upshot is that the Pittsburgh Kantians have a distinctive approach to Kant, but also radically different responses to his problem of objective purport.

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