Subatomic Particles, Epistemic Stances, and Kantian Antinomies

In Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength (isostheneia) of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility (ataraxia) by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, we should adopt a position that remains underrated in Chakravartty’s analysis: a position that amounts to a modern-day variant of the Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and that like the original Kantian combination, is capable of solving many instances of the dramatic conflict between empiricism and metaphysics and, in particular, a conflict that is the talk of the town in philosophy of science these days—the conflict between ontic-structural realism and Lewisian metaphysics.

Krytyka czystego rozumu jako krytyka czystego doświadczenia. Kant a współczesne spory wokół treści percepcji

Critique of Pure Reason as a critique of pure experience. Kant and contemporary disputes over the content of perception:­ The ­article ­is ­an­ attempt ­at critically ­analysing­ the ­conceptual­ content ­of ­perception ­in ­Immanuel ­Kant’s transcendental philosophy.­ The ­author ­claims­ that ­unity ­as ­the ­feature ­of ­forms ­of ­intuition ­is ­closely ­related­ to unity ­as ­the ­category ­of ­the­ intellect ­and ­as ­such ­with ­the ­uniting ­synthesis ­of ­apperception. The­ author­ also claims­ that defending ­the ­non­‐conceptual ­content ­may ­result ­in ­losing ­the essence ­of ­Kant’s ­identification­ of empirical ­realism ­with ­transcendental­ idealism.­ Kant’s conceptualism ­leads ­to ­the ­thesis ­that­ non‐­conceptual content­ is ­only ­abstracted ­from the context ­of ­perception ­and ­may ­be­ treated­ as ­an ­object ­of ­thinking, ­but ­not as ­an ­object ­of perceiving.

Kant’s Case for Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

The foundational structure of, and Kant’s arguments for his transcendental idealism and empirical realism are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the ‘master argument’ in the Transcendental Aesthetic for the thesis that space and time are transcendentally ideal and nothing but forms of sensibility. A reconstruction of the master argument is provided, and each of its premises is examined in detail, including the especially important premise that we have an a priori intuition of space and time.

Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

The core claims of transcendental idealism are examined, according to which empirical objects and empirical selves are appearances and not things in themselves, and pure space and time are nothing but forms of sensibility. Kant is shown to be a relationalist about empirical space and time in holding that empirical space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of empirical objects. Furthermore, it is explicated how Kant can be both a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist about empirical objects, empirical selves, and empirical space and time, and how his idealism differs from transcendental realism, as well as from ordinary idealism such as Berkeley’s.

The World According to Kant

The World According to Kant offers an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s critical idealism, as developed in the Critique of Pure Reason and associated texts. Critical idealism is understood as an ontological position, which comprises transcendental idealism, empirical realism, and a number of other basic ontological theses. According to Kant, the world, understood as the sum total of everything that has reality, comprises several levels of reality, most importantly, the transcendental level and the empirical level. The transcendental level is a mind-independent level at which things in themselves exist. The empirical level is a fully mind-dependent level at which appearances exist, which are intentional objects of experience. Empirical objects and empirical minds are appearances, and empirical space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of appearances. On the proposed interpretation, Kant is thus a genuine idealist about empirical objects, empirical minds, and space and time. But in contrast to other intentional objects, appearances genuinely exist, which is due both to the special character of experience compared to other kinds of representations such as illusions and dreams, and to the grounding of appearances in things themselves. This is why, on the proposed interpretation, Kant is also a genuine realist about empirical objects, empirical minds, and empirical space and time. This book develops the indicated interpretation, spells out Kant’s case for critical idealism thus understood, pinpoints the differences between critical idealism and ‘ordinary’ idealism, such as Berkley’s, and clarifies the relation between Kant’s conception of things in themselves and the conception of things in themselves by other philosophers, in particular, Kant’s Leibniz-Wolffian predecessors.

Is the Kantian Transcendentalism Idealism? Kant's Conceptual Realism

In my paper I argue, relying on Kantian definitions and conceptual distinctions, the thesis that Kantian transcen-dental philosophy, which he characterizes as a second-order system of transcendental idealism, is not [empirical] idealism, but a form of realism (resp. compatible with empirical realism [A370-1]). As arguments in favor of this “realistic” thesis, I consistently develop a realistic interpretation of the Kant’s concept of appearance (the theory of “two aspects”), as well as of Kantian Copernican revolution, of his theory of intuition as cognitive ability which 'giving' ‘us objects, of the concept of double affection and noumenal causality.

Critical realism and organizational learning

Purpose This study aims to investigate the implications of applying critical realism to the study of organizational learning. It considers critical realism as an alternate theoretical science foundation to the domains of empirical realism and social constructivism that characterize most of the field of organizational learning. Design/methodology/approach This study adopts the approach of a philosophical/conceptual discussion. Findings This study finds that the critical realist approach makes it possible for organizational learning researchers to apply a prescriptive change agenda. It requires researchers to study the context in which organizational learning occurs. These two features enable the researcher to propose what the world must be like for organizational learning to occur. Hence, a critical realist foundation moves organizational learning theory a step closer to its theoretical sibling, the learning organization. Originality/value This study reveals the potential in applying critical realism to the study of organizational learning and identifies its related strengths.

Mendelssohn, Kant, and Idealism

After examining the dispute between Mendelssohn and Kant over the ideality of time in 1770, this chapter argues that Kant’s addition of a “Refutation of Idealism” to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1787 is a response to Mendelssohn’s treatment of idealism in his 1785 Morning Hours. Both defend the position that Kant calls empirical realism, but only Kant defends it by means of a transcendental argument that knowledge of external objects is a necessary condition of empirical self-knowledge, although only within the framework of transcendental idealism. Mendelssohn accepts that human experience can never tell us how things are in themselves, but does not accept Kant’s outright denial of the non-spatiality and non-temporality of things in themselves.

El espacio en cuanto forma de los fenómenos y la tesis de la receptividad: mutua implicación

Mi objetivo es hacer notar que existe un nexo de mutua implicación entre dos tesis kantianas: la tesis de la receptividad (nuestro conocimiento depende de que seamos afectados por los objetos) y la tesis del espacio en cuanto forma de los fenómenos. Un tratamiento completo de la tesis de la receptividad implica el idealismo trascendental de Kant en torno al espacio. Desde mi lectura, ello en absoluto afecta al realismo empírico kantiano. Para mostrar lo anterior, exploro aquí la segunda consecuencia ("b) a la que Kant arriba tras haber presentado sus argumentos en favor de la naturaleza a priori e intuitiva del espacio en la Estética Trascendental. Palabras clave: espacio, forma de la intuición, receptividad, idealismo trascendental, realismo empírico Abstract: My purpose in this paper is to point out that there is a mutual implication between two Kantian thesis: the Receptivity Thesis (our knowledge depends on being affected by objects) and the thesis of the space at a form of the phenomena; so that, a full treatment of the receptivity thesis implies Kant's transcendental idealism of space. On my reading this doesn't compromise Kant's empirical realism. In order to show this I explore here the second consequence ("b") that Kant arrives after he shows his arguments in favour of the space in the Transcendental Aesthetics. Keywords: space, form of intuition, receptivity, transcendental idealism, empirical realism