Rent Seeking and the Provision of Public Goods

1993 ◽  
Vol 103 (420) ◽  
pp. 1236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Gradstein
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Rent Seeking

Tullock, G., 2005, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-107
Author(s):  
Emma Galli
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Edward Elgar

Abstract Tullock, G., 2005, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, The Locke Institute, pp. vii-163, ISBN 1-84376-637-X, £ 45.

A general model of rent seeking for public goods

1995 ◽  
pp. 361-377
Author(s):  
Khalid Riaz ◽  
Jason F. Shogren ◽  
Stanley R. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
General Model ◽  
Rent Seeking

Rent-seeking for pure public goods

2001 ◽  
pp. 137-147
Author(s):  
Eliakim Katz ◽  
Shmuel Nitzan ◽  
Jacob Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Rent Seeking

Public goods, redistribution and rent seeking

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (02) ◽  
pp. 43-1068-43-1068
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Rent Seeking

Free-rider effects in rent-seeking groups competing for public goods

Public Choice ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 86 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 35-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edna Loehman ◽  
Fabrice N. Quesnel ◽  
Emerson M. Babb
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Free Rider

The Effect of Incentives: The Problem of Collective Action

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-165
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan ◽  
William English ◽  
John Hasnas ◽  
Peter Jaworski
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Firm Structure ◽  
Group Interest ◽  
Group Settings ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Group Members

Even if cooperating will make everyone better off, cooperation won’t happen if people lack certain kinds of knowledge and motivation. In group settings, individuals will often have incentives to promote their own interest at the expense of the group, either by exploiting others or by failing to contribute to public goods. There are two ways to overcome these “collective action” problems: (1) the incentives that individuals face can be changed so that individual and group interest no longer conflict, and/or (2) group members can embrace norms that enable them to exercise self-restraint and forego opportunities to get ahead at the expense of others. The rule of law, property rights, and proper firm structure can help overcome collective action problems. However, these same structures can also create new opportunities for rent seeking.

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