Abstract Tullock, G., 2005, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, The Locke Institute, pp. vii-163, ISBN 1-84376-637-X, £ 45.
Even if cooperating will make everyone better off, cooperation won’t happen if people lack certain kinds of knowledge and motivation. In group settings, individuals will often have incentives to promote their own interest at the expense of the group, either by exploiting others or by failing to contribute to public goods. There are two ways to overcome these “collective action” problems: (1) the incentives that individuals face can be changed so that individual and group interest no longer conflict, and/or (2) group members can embrace norms that enable them to exercise self-restraint and forego opportunities to get ahead at the expense of others. The rule of law, property rights, and proper firm structure can help overcome collective action problems. However, these same structures can also create new opportunities for rent seeking.
