Research on Evolutionary Game of Collaborative Innovation in Supply Chain under Digitization Background

The development of digital technology has been rapidly pushing forward collaborative innovation in supply chain. This paper analyzes the influence mechanism of information sharing, resource integration, and trustworthiness among the enterprises in supply chain to collaborative innovation under the digitization background and builds the model of dynamic evolutionary game in which enterprises in supply chain participate collaborative innovation, and then, through the methods of model solution analysis and numerical simulation the following concrete conclusions are reached: the increase of data sharing profit coefficient, resource integration coefficient, and trustworthiness causes the increase of the probability that an enterprise selects to participate collaborative innovation in supply chain, and the increase of data sharing cost, security risk coefficient, and free rider income causes the decrease of the probability that an enterprise selects to participate collaborative innovation in supply chain; meanwhile, the increase of all the coefficients makes the velocity with which decision-making approaches to the direction toward decision higher and higher, and when the core enterprises participate the game, they can drive the common enterprises make decision more rapidly; and for the probability that an enterprise selects to participate collaborative innovation in supply chain, data sharing profit coefficient, data sharing cost coefficient, security risk coefficient, and free rider income have threshold values. These conclusions play active roles in leading enterprises to attach importance to digitization construction and actively participate collaborative innovation in supply chain.

The moratorium on loan repayments during the Covid-19 Pandemic in Europe: a comparative analysis of loan moratoria in selected European countries

This paper examines the moratorium on loan repayments, which was intended to relieve debtors in a difficult situation during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this study, various aspects of such moratoria are critically discussed and compared from an international perspective. Some debtors were significantly hit hard by the pandemic, whereas others were no. But should the moratoria apply to all of them? The free-rider problem, or even harm to some clients, are among the unintended results of the moratorium. Moreover, the loan repayment moratorium has different effects on the traditional banking sector and on P2P lending platforms. Such differences were not discussed sufficiently before adopting the moratoria. The different effects might have a negative impact on some debtors, on some creditors, or on the market and society in general. Along with using some traditional legal research methods, this paper takes a comparative perspective on loan repayment moratoria in different EU countries among. The conclusions of the paper may help regulators and lawmakers prepare more balanced regulations of loan repayments in the next crisis. Future regulations should reflect the perspectives of both debtors and creditors.

An Analysis of Government Interventions in Addressing Market Failures Caused by Non-Excludable and Non-Rivalrous Public Goods Based on COVID-19 Vaccination Cases

The non-excludable and non-rivalrous characteristics of public goods distinguish them from private goods. The existence of these two characteristics leads to the “free rider problem” and the variation problem, making the market supply less than the actual demand, thus causing market failure. The government should therefore intervene against this impact. At the beginning of 2020, the global outbreak of the novel COVID-19 brought significant harm to various countries, races, and groups of people. In the second half of 2020, several companies developed vaccines, which are able to fundamentally block the transmission of the virus. However, as vaccines have been reducing the severity of the epidemic in certain regions, the situation somewhat reflects non-excludability and non-rivalry, in which before officially being listed in vaccination programs, the society may have the thought of “vaccination would reduce the risk of transmission; thus, I can enjoy the reduced risk of everyone being vaccinated without paying for it.” For this reason, most countries have been purchasing vaccines for the public through government appropriations to solve the free-rider problem. It can be said that in the face of market failure caused by public goods, the government should carry out timely intervention measures, including taxation and government appropriation, to avoid negative impacts from the characteristics of public goods.

CLIMATE POLICIES: CHALLENGES, OBSTACLES AND TOOLS

A four-pronged approach to climate policy is presented consisting of carbon pricing, subsidies for renewable energies, transformative green investments and climate finance and engendering flywheel effects. Then, a variety of societal and political challenges and obstacles faced by such a climate policy and what can be done to overcome them are discussed. These range from stranded assets, the very long time scales needed to adapt and deal with global warming, intergenerational conflict, international free-rider problems, carbon leakage, green paradoxes, policy failure and capture, adverse income distributional effects and spatial scarcity to the problem of climate deniers and sceptics. The paper also discusses the various tools that are needed for the analysis of both ideal and workable climate policies, and the need to collaborate with complexity scholars, political scientists, sociologists and psychologists.

The Battle over Patents

Do patents facilitate or frustrate innovation? Lawyers, economists, and politicians who have staked out strong positions in this debate often attempt to validate their claims by invoking the historical record—but they typically get the history wrong. The purpose of this book is to get the history right by showing that patent systems are the product of contending interests at different points in production chains battling over economic surplus. The larger the potential surplus, the more extreme are the efforts of contending parties, now and in the past, to search out, generate, and exploit any and all sources of friction. Patent systems, as human creations, are therefore necessarily ridden with imperfections; nirvana is not on the menu. The most interesting intellectual issue is not how patent systems are imperfect, but why historically US-style patent systems have come to dominate all other methods of encouraging inventive activity. The answer offered by the essays in this volume is that they create a temporary property right that can be traded in a market, thereby facilitating a productive division of labor and making it possible for firms to transfer technological knowledge to one another by overcoming the free-rider problem. Precisely because the value of a patent does not inhere in the award itself but rather in the market value of the resulting property right, patent systems foster a decentralized ecology of inventors and firms that ceaselessly extends the frontiers of what is economically possible.

Designing the Optimal International Climate Agreement with Variability in Commitments

We analyze the design of an international climate agreement. In particular, we consider two goals of such an agreement: overcoming free-rider problems and adjusting for differences in mitigation costs between countries. Previous work suggests that it is difficult to achieve both of these goals at once under asymmetric information because countries free ride by exaggerating their abatement costs. We argue that independent information collection (investigations) by an international organization can alleviate this problem. In fact, though the best implementable climate agreement without investigations fails to adjust for individual differences even with significant enforcement power, a mechanism with investigations allows adjustment and can enable implementation of the socially optimal agreement. Furthermore, when the organization has significant enforcement power, the optimal agreement is achievable even with minimal investigative resources (and vice versa). The results suggest that discussions about institutions for climate cooperation should focus on information collection as well as enforcement.