A general model of rent seeking for public goods

Author(s):  
Khalid Riaz ◽  
Jason F. Shogren ◽  
Stanley R. Johnson

Public Choice ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 82 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 243-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khalid Riaz ◽  
Jason F. Shogren ◽  
Stanley R. Johnson


Author(s):  
Rohan Dutta ◽  
David K Levine ◽  
Salvatore Modica

Abstract We study the consequences of policy interventions when social norms are endogenous but costly to change. In our environment a group faces a negative externality that it partially mitigates through incentives in the form of punishments. In this setting policy interventions can have unexpected consequences. The most striking is that when the cost of bargaining is high introducing a Pigouvian tax can increase output - yet in doing so increase welfare. An observer who saw that an increase in a Pigouvian tax raised output might wrongly conclude that this harmed welfare and that a larger tax increase would also raise output. This counter-intuitive impact on output is demonstrated theoretically for a general model and found in case studies for public goods subsidies and cartels.



1993 ◽  
Vol 103 (420) ◽  
pp. 1236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Gradstein
Keyword(s):  




2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-107
Author(s):  
Emma Galli

Abstract Tullock, G., 2005, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, The Locke Institute, pp. vii-163, ISBN 1-84376-637-X, £ 45.



Author(s):  
Vincent Geloso ◽  
Phillip Magness


Author(s):  
James A.R. Marshall

This chapter considers a simple and general model of natural selection: replicator dynamics. Many animal traits and behaviors are social, in that they affect the reproductive success not just of the animal performing the behavior, but also conspecifics. Mathematical theories based on classical natural selection, which acts on direct reproduction by individuals, are able to explain the evolution of traits that are for personal advantage. However, this leaves the problem of providing an evolutionary explanation of traits and social behaviors that appear to be personally costly to the bearer, in reproductive terms, while having effects on conspecifics such as increasing their direct reproduction. This chapter uses the replicator dynamics to illustrate the action of natural selection on social behavior, including nonadditive interactions. It considers the additive and nonadditive donation game, and other social interactions, along with public goods games, threshold public goods games, and interactions in structured populations.



2001 ◽  
pp. 137-147
Author(s):  
Eliakim Katz ◽  
Shmuel Nitzan ◽  
Jacob Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  


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