scholarly journals Why probability ambiguity in the many-worlds interpretation is blessing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minseong Kim

The question of how to make sense of probability in the many-worlds interpretation is a controversial and difficult one. Conventional literature attempts to provide a correct way of assigning probability to each world in the universe of many worlds. Differing from these attempts, it is argued that probability ambiguity in the many-worlds interpretation is not a curse but a blessing, allowing us to study quantum phenomena in terms of conventional thermodynamics, connecting readily to black hole thermodynamics.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minseong Kim

This paper exploits well-known connections between quantum mechanics and thermodynamics. What happens if we assume that the first law of thermodynamics applies generally, inspired from thermodynamic and entropic gravity approaches and black hole thermodynamics? The conjecture is that quantum mechanics provides a complete dynamic description of thermodynamics that the first law of thermodynamics seems to call for, giving us a theory of holographic gravity. Some connections to the many-worlds interpretation are noted.


Author(s):  
Bruce S. Bennett ◽  
Moletlanyi Tshipa

AbstractThe Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) is a theory in physics which proposes that, rather than quantum-level events being resolved randomly as according to the Copenhagen Interpretation, the universe constantly divides into different versions or worlds. All physically possible worlds occur, though some outcomes are more likely than others, and therefore all possible histories exist. This paper explores some implications of this for history, especially concerning causation. Unlike counterfactuals, which concern different starting conditions, MWI concerns different outcomes of the same starting conditions. It is argued that analysis of causation needs to take into account the divergence of outcomes and the possibility that we inhabit a less probable world. Another implication of MWI is convergent history: for any given world there will be similar worlds which are the result of different pasts which are, however, more or less probable. MWI can assist in thinking about historical causation and indicates the importance of probabilistic causation.


Wilmott ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (105) ◽  
pp. 10-11
Author(s):  
Aaron Brown

Physics Today ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 72 (12) ◽  
pp. 56-57
Author(s):  
Matthew Leifer

Phronesis ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-139 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractTwo readings of the much-discussed περιτρoπη argument of Theaetetus 170c-171c have dominated the literature. One I call "the relativity reading". On this reading, the argument fails by ignoratio elenchi because it "carelessly" omits "the qualifications 'true for so-and-so' which [Protagoras'] theory insists on" (Bostock 1988: 90). The other reading I call "the many-worlds interpretation". On this view, Plato's argument succeeds in showing that "Protagoras' position becomes utterly self-contradictory" because "he claims that everyone lives in his own relativistic world, yet at the same time he is forced by that very claim to admit that no one does" (Burnyeat 1976b: 48). I discuss and criticise both readings, and present a third, according to which the point of the argument is, very roughly, that Protagoras is committed to equating truth and truth-for, and so, further, to their intersubstitutability. This further commitment proves fatal to his argument.


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