scholarly journals Pasar Persaingan Sempurna

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nur Adillah Agnusia ◽  
UMMUL FADILAH ◽  
Nola Azzahra
Keyword(s):  

Struktur pasar dibedakan berdasarkan banyaknya penjual dan pembeli. Secara mudah dikatakan pasar yang terdiri dari banyak penjual dengan barang yang relatif homogen disebut pasar bersaing sempurna (perfect competition). Pasar persaingan sempurna adalah suatu pasar di mana jumlah penjual dan pembeli (konsumen) sangat banyak dan produk atau barang yang ditawarkan atau dijual sejenis atauserupa. Pada pasar ini kekuatan permintaan dan kekuatan penawaran dapat bergerak secara leluasa. Ada pun harga yang terbentuk benar-benar mencerminkan keinginan produsen dankonsumen. Permintaan mencerminkan keinginan konsumen, sementara penawaran mencerminkan keinginan produsen atau penjual. Bentuk pasar persaingan murni terdapat terutama dalam bidang produksi dan perdagangan hasil-hasil pertanian seperti beras, terigu,kopra, dan minyak kelapa. Bentuk pasar ini terdapat pula perdagangankecil danpenyelenggaraan jasa-jasa yang tidak memerlukan keahlian istimewa (pertukangan,kerajinan ).

Author(s):  
Avinash Dixit

If formal institutions of contract governance are absent or ineffective, traders try to substitute relational governance based on norms and sanctions. However, these alternatives need good information and communication concerning members’ actions; that works well only in relatively small communities. If there are fixed costs, the market has too few firms for perfect competition. The optimum must be a second best, balancing the effectiveness of contract governance and dead-weight loss of monopoly. This chapter explores this idea using a spatial model with monopolistic competition. It is found that relational governance constrains the size of firms and can cause inefficiently excessive entry, beyond the excess that already occurs in a spatial model without governance problems. Effects of alternative methods of improving governance to ameliorate this inefficiency are explored.


1992 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-261
Author(s):  
Susan E. Skeath ◽  
Ann D. Velenchik ◽  
Len M. Nichols ◽  
Karl E. Case
Keyword(s):  

1964 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 121 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Calvin Gogerty ◽  
Gordon C. Winston
Keyword(s):  

1982 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreu Mas-Colell
Keyword(s):  

1982 ◽  
Vol 92 (367) ◽  
pp. 706
Author(s):  
Yew-Kwang Ng
Keyword(s):  

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
A Maarit I Kallio

Efficient functioning of the wood market is crucial in a country where the forest sector is of strong macroeconomic importance. We investigate the possibility of noncompetitive behavior of the buyers in the Finnish pulpwood market. We simulate the buyers' behavior under alternative competition structures (perfect competition, Cournot oligopsony, and monopsony) and compare the simulated equilibria with the observed behavior in the years 1988–1997. In the static models the pulp industry firms are assumed to maximize their short-run variable profits either under fixed production capacity or, hypothetically, under variable capacity. The results suggest that, during the boom years, the industry has been capacity constrained, sometimes even for monopsony output. During the recession years, the actual wood prices have often been between simulated Cournot oligopsony and monopsony prices. Hence, noncompetitive behavior of the buyers is possible during the recessions. The capacity investment behavior of the industry is explored with dynamic models. The conclusions from these models depend on the price elasticity of pulpwood supply used.


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