scholarly journals Understanding the Interactions between the Scrum Master and the Development Team: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 1553
Author(s):  
Tugba Karabiyik ◽  
Aparajita Jaiswal ◽  
Paul Thomas ◽  
Alejandra J. Magana

Scrum methodology is widely used in the information technology (IT) industry for the purposes of team-based iterative software development. However, limited studies have been conducted to explore the nature of interactions between a Scrum Master and other team members and the effect of these interactions on team effectiveness. The aim of this study is to understand the interactions between the Scrum Master and other team members in an educational setting and propose and demonstrate an application of cooperative game theory for the same. Cooperative game theory can model scenarios where other team members can benefit from cooperating. Through the lens of the cooperative game-theoretic model, we investigated the strategies employed by the Scrum Master and other team members when involved in a semi-capstone IT project. Specifically, the study explored the team interaction between a Scrum Master and other team members at three different levels of team effectiveness: least effective, partially effective, and most effective. Our results indicate that a Scrum Master should be active to maximize their payoff as well as the teams’ overall payoff. Contrary to this, other team members should be active in the most and partially effective teams, while being passive in the least effective teams at higher costs of interpersonal relations and the processes. The results of the study represent a novel application of game-theoretic modeling for understanding the Scrum Master and other team member interactions. These results are applicable not just in an educational setting but also to the wider area of software development by identifying the right set of strategies by the Scrum Master, and other team members in order to help IT professionals to maximize their payoff.

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Takayuki Oishi

In practice, collusive bidders' rings in English auctions with a single object frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of re-auctions called knockouts. The present paper introduces a model of sequences of knockouts under the situation in which each bidder has information on his evaluation and the order of the evaluations of all bidders for the object. The present paper examines the distributive function of sequences of knockouts from the viewpoint of cooperative game theory. Each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core, two particular sequences yielding the Shapley value and the nucleolus respectively. The present paper highlights the sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Kafi ◽  
S. M. T. Fatemi Ghomi

There is a rising trend in supplying chain management to employ simultaneous cooperation and competition (coopetition) among supply chain partners as an efficient strategy to create value. There exist, however, few models which analyze coopetitive situations mathematically. Cooperative game theory is the common tool in analyzing cooperative situations. However, the term “cooperative” in “cooperative game theory” is absolutely misleading since it ultimately leads to competition analysis and ignores the internal structure of the cooperation. Coopetition, however, results in structural transformations in players. Therefore, we require a mathematical modeling approach which takes into account the internal structural changes due to cooperation among competitors. In so doing, in this paper we propose, we assume that those parameters of each firm’s profit function are subject to transformation by cooperation as a function of cooperation level so as to determine the right level of cooperation and production of firms while considering technical cooperation between them. Furthermore, we demonstrate the results of applying the idea to a supply chain situation where two similar suppliers participate. We conclude that under intuitive conditions coopetition strategy is superior to the pure competitive relationship between the suppliers in terms of profitability which validates the previous empirical results mathematically.


Author(s):  
Cunbin Li ◽  
Ding Liu ◽  
Yi Wang ◽  
Chunyan Liang

AbstractAdvanced grid technology represented by smart grid and energy internet is the core feature of the next-generation power grid. The next-generation power grid will be a large-scale cyber-physical system (CPS), which will have a higher level of risk management due to its flexibility in sensing and control. This paper explains the methods and results of a study on grid CPS’s behavior after risk. Firstly, a behavior model based on hybrid automata is built to simulate grid CPS’s risk decisions. Then, a GCPS risk transfer model based on cooperative game theory is built. The model allows decisions to ignore complex network structures. On this basis, a modified applicant-proposing algorithm to achieve risk optimum is proposed. The risk management model proposed in this paper can provide references for power generation and transmission decision after risk as well as risk aversion, an empirical study in north China verifies its validity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 145 ◽  
pp. 111056
Author(s):  
Andrey Churkin ◽  
Janusz Bialek ◽  
David Pozo ◽  
Enzo Sauma ◽  
Nikolay Korgin

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag

Database tuples can be seen as players in the game of jointly realizing the answer to a query. Some tuples may contribute more than others to the outcome, which can be a binary value in the case of a Boolean query, a number for a numerical aggregate query, and so on. To quantify the contributions of tuples, we use the Shapley value that was introduced in cooperative game theory and has found applications in a plethora of domains. Specifically, the Shapley value of an individual tuple quantifies its contribution to the query. We investigate the applicability of the Shapley value in this setting, as well as the computational aspects of its calculation in terms of complexity, algorithms, and approximation.


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