scholarly journals Implicit Mentalising during Level-1 Visual Perspective-Taking Indicated by Dissociation with Attention Orienting

Vision ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Gardner ◽  
Aiste Bileviciute ◽  
Caroline Edmonds
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Schneider ◽  
Anne Grigutsch ◽  
Matthias Schurz ◽  
Romi Zäske ◽  
Stefan R. Schweinberger

It has been hypothesized that visual perspective-taking, a basic Theory of Mind mechanism, might operate quite automatically particularly in terms of ´what´ someone else sees. As such we were interested in whether different social categories of an agent (e.g., gender, race, nationality) influence this mental state ascription mechanism. We tested this assumption by investigating the Samson level-1 visual perspective-taking paradigm using agents with different ethnic nationality appearances. A group of self-identified Turkish and German participants were asked to make visual perspective judgments from their own perspective (self-judgment) as well as from the perspective of a prototypical Turkish or German agent (other-judgment). The respective related interference effects - altercentric and egocentric interferences - were measured. When making other-judgments, German participants showed increased egocentric interferences for Turkish compared to German agents. Turkish participants showed no ethnic group influence for egocentric interferences and reported feeling associated with the German and Turkish nationality to a similar extent. For self-judgments, altercentric interferences were of similar magnitude for both ethnic agents in both participant groups. Overall this indicates that in level-1 visual perspective-taking, other-judgments and related egocentric interferences are sensitive to social categories and are better described as a flexible, controlled and deliberate mental state ascription mechanism. In contrast, self-judgments and related altercentric interference effects are better described as automatic, efficient and unconscious mental state ascription mechanisms. In a broader sense the current results suggest that we should stop considering automaticity an all-or-none principle when it comes theory of mind processes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 1020-1029 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark R Gardner ◽  
Zainabb Hull ◽  
Donna Taylor ◽  
Caroline J Edmonds

Experiments revealing ‘spontaneous’ visual perspective-taking are conventionally interpreted as demonstrating that adults have the capacity to track simple mental states in a fast and efficient manner (‘implicit mentalising’). A rival account suggests that these experiments can be explained by the general purpose mechanisms responsible for reflexive attentional orienting. Here, we report two experiments designed to distinguish between these competing accounts. In Experiment 1, we assessed whether reflexive attention orienting was sufficient to yield findings interpreted as spontaneous perspective-taking in the ‘avatar task’ when the protocol was adapted so that participants were unaware that they were taking part in a perspective-taking experiment. Results revealed no evidence for perspective-taking. In Experiment 2, we employed a Posner paradigm to investigate the attentional orienting properties of the avatar stimuli. This revealed cue-validity effects only for longer stimulus onset asynchronies, which indicates a voluntary rather than reflexive shift in spatial attention. Taken together, these findings suggest that attentional orienting does indeed contribute to performance in the Samson et al. avatar task. However, attention orienting appears to be voluntary rather than reflexive, indicating that the perspective-taking phenomenon measured may be less spontaneous than first reported.


Cognition ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 159 ◽  
pp. 97-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Todd ◽  
C. Daryl Cameron ◽  
Austin J. Simpson

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 1671-1685 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl F. MacDorman ◽  
Preethi Srinivas ◽  
Himalaya Patel

1991 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacinta Tan ◽  
Paul L. Harris

AbstractAutistic children were assessed for their understanding of seeing and wanting. In Experiment 1, they judged whether a target was visible to each of two observers (a Level 1 task of visual perspective-taking) and which of two targets each observer would identify as “in front” (a Level 2 task). The autistic children performed as well as normal children of the same verbal mental age on both tasks. In Experiment 2, autistic children identified the emotion that familiar situations would elicit, expressed a selective preference or desire, and reidentified that desire despite an outcome that thwarted it. Their performance was similar to that of normal and retarded children equated for verbal mental age. An explanation is offered for autistic children's difficulty on some psychological tasks and their relative success on others.


1991 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacinta Tan ◽  
Paul L. Harris

AbstractAutistic children were assessed for their understanding of seeing and wanting. In Experiment 1, they judged whether a target was visible to each of two observers [a Level 1 task of visual perspective-taking] and which of two targets each observer would identify as “in front” [a Level 2 task]. The autistic children performed as well as normal children of the same verbal mental age on both tasks. In Experiment 2, autistic children identified the emotion that familiar situations would elicit, expressed a selective preference or desire, and reidentified that desire despite an outcome that thwarted it. Their performance was similar to that of normal and retarded children equated for verbal mental age. An explanation is offered for autistic children's difficulty on some psychological tasks and their relative success on others.


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