Optimal Strategy Analysis of N-Policy FM/FEk/1 Vacation Queueing System with Server Start-Up and Time-Out

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
OPSEARCH ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Anantha Lakshmi ◽  
M. I. Afthab Begum ◽  
S. Swaroopa Rani

OPSEARCH ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasanta Kumar Vemuri ◽  
Venkata Siva Nageswara Hari Prasad Boppana ◽  
Chandan Kotagiri ◽  
Ravi Teja Bethapudi

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Vasanta Kumar ◽  
K. Chandan ◽  
B. Ravi Teja ◽  
B.V.S.N. Hari Prasad

1993 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 359-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. R. Muh

The author studies the queueing process in a single-server, bulk arrival and batch service queueing system with a compound Poisson input, bilevel service delay discipline, start-up time, and a fixed accumulation level with control operating policy. It is assumed that when the queue length falls below a predefined level r(≥1), the system, with server capacity R, immediately stops service until the queue length reaches or exceeds the second predefined accumulation level N(≥r). Two cases, with N≤R and N≥R, are studied.The author finds explicitly the probability generating function of the stationary distribution of the queueing process and gives numerical examples.


Author(s):  
Zeng Hui ◽  
Tian Ruiling ◽  
Liu Yupeng ◽  
Hou Yumei

The authors' study a noncooperative game problem for queueing control in emergency department (ED). One of the challenges to emergency department (ED) is the control of the urgent patients and the non-urgent patients. The urgent patient which is the primary customer, can be considered as the service interruption in a queueing system. The service interruptions occur frequently and can incur significant delays for the non-urgent patients. Therefore, a non-urgent patient needs to decide whether to join the queue or leave. The scenario is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing game with server interruption where each patient wants to optimize his benefit. It is shown that the individually optimal strategy for joining the queue is characterized by a threshold of queue length. The socially optimal threshold of queue length is also obtained. To bridge the gap between the individually and socially optimal strategies, a pricing mechanism is proposed to toll the service of each non-urgent patient, thus equalizing the two optimal strategies.


Author(s):  
Govindhan Ayyappan ◽  
Udayageetha J

This paper considers  M[X1],M[X2]/G1,G2/1 general retrial queueing system with priority services. Two types of customers from different classes arrive at the system in different independent compound Poisson processes. The server follows the pre-emptive priority rule subject to working breakdown, startup/closedown time and Bernoulli vacation with general (arbitrary) vacation periods. After completing the service, if there are no priority customers present in the system the server may go for a vacation or close down the system. On completion of the close down, the server needs some time to set up the system. The priority customers who find the server busy are queued in the system. A low-priority customer who find the server busy are routed to a retrial (orbit) queue that attempts to get the service. The system may breakdown at any point of time when it is in operation. However, when the system fails, instead of stopping service completely, the service is continued only to the high priority customers at a slower rate. We consider balking to occur to the low priority customer while the server is busy or idle, and reneging to occur at the high priority customers during server’s vacation, start up/close down time. Using the supplementary variable technique, we derive the joint distribution of the server state and the number of customers in the system. Finally, some performance measures and numerical examples are presented.


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