The Construction of ElGamal over Koblitz Curve

2014 ◽  
Vol 931-932 ◽  
pp. 1441-1446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krissanee Kamthawee ◽  
Bhichate Chiewthanakul

Recently elliptic curve cryptosystems are widely accepted for security applications key generation, signature and verification. Cryptographic mechanisms based on elliptic curves depend on arithmetic involving the points of the curve. it is possible to use smaller primes, or smaller finite fields, with elliptic curves and achieve a level of security comparable to that for much larger integers. Koblitz curves, also known as anomalous binary curves, are elliptic curves defined over F2. The primary advantage of these curves is that point multiplication algorithms can be devised that do not use any point doublings. The ElGamal cryptosystem, which is based on the Discrete Logarithm problem can be implemented in any group. In this paper, we propose the ElGamal over Koblitz Curve Scheme by applying the arithmetic on Koblitz curve to the ElGamal cryptosystem. The advantage of this scheme is that point multiplication algorithms can be speeded up the scalar multiplication in the affine coodinate of the curves using Frobenius map. It has characteristic two, therefore it’s arithmetic can be designed in any computer hardware. Moreover, it has more efficient to employ the TNAF method for scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves to decrease the number of nonzero digits. It’s security relies on the inability of a forger, who does not know a private key, to compute elliptic curve discrete logarithm.

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-88
Author(s):  
Kunal Abhishek ◽  
E. George Dharma Prakash Raj

Abstract Short Weierstrass elliptic curves with underlying hard Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) are widely used in cryptographic applications. A notion of security called Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) security is also suggested in literature to safeguard the elliptic curve cryptosystems from their implementation flaws. In this paper, a new security notion called the “trusted security” is introduced for computational method of elliptic curves for cryptography. We propose three additional “trusted security acceptance criteria” which need to be met by the elliptic curves aimed for cryptography. Further, two cryptographically secure elliptic curves over 256 bit and 384 bit prime fields are demonstrated which are secure from ECDLP, ECC as well as trust perspectives. The proposed elliptic curves are successfully subjected to thorough security analysis and performance evaluation with respect to key generation and signing/verification and hence, proven for their cryptographic suitability and great feasibility for acceptance by the community.


Author(s):  
Anna ILYENKO ◽  
Sergii ILYENKO ◽  
Yana MASUR

In this article, the main problems underlying the current asymmetric crypto algorithms for the formation and verification of electronic-digital signature are considered: problems of factorization of large integers and problems of discrete logarithm. It is noted that for the second problem, it is possible to use algebraic groups of points other than finite fields. The group of points of the elliptical curve, which satisfies all set requirements, looked attractive on this side. Aspects of the application of elliptic curves in cryptography and the possibilities offered by these algebraic groups in terms of computational efficiency and crypto-stability of algorithms were also considered. Information systems using elliptic curves, the keys have a shorter length than the algorithms above the finite fields. Theoretical directions of improvement of procedure of formation and verification of electronic-digital signature with the possibility of ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of information were considered. The proposed method is based on the Schnorr signature algorithm, which allows data to be recovered directly from the signature itself, similarly to RSA-like signature systems, and the amount of recoverable information is variable depending on the information message. As a result, the length of the signature itself, which is equal to the sum of the length of the end field over which the elliptic curve is determined, and the artificial excess redundancy provided to the hidden message was achieved.


2004 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 167-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Hess

AbstractThe Weil descent construction of the GHS attack on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is generalised in this paper, to arbitrary Artin-Schreier extensions. A formula is given for the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius for the curves thus obtained, as well as a proof that the large cyclic factor of the input elliptic curve is not contained in the kernel of the composition of the conorm and norm maps. As an application, the number of elliptic curves that succumb to the basic GHS attack is considerably increased, thereby further weakening curves over GF2155.Other possible extensions or variations of the GHS attack are discussed, leading to the conclusion that they are unlikely to yield further improvements.


Author(s):  
Andreas Bolfing

This chapter provides a very detailed introduction to cryptography. It first explains the cryptographic basics and introduces the concept of public-key encryption which is based on one-way and trapdoor functions, considering the three major public-key encryption families like integer factorization, discrete logarithm and elliptic curve schemes. This is followed by an introduction to hash functions which are applied to construct Merkle trees and digital signature schemes. As modern cryptoschemes are commonly based on elliptic curves, the chapter then introduces elliptic curve cryptography which is based on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). It considers the hardness of the ECDLP and the possible attacks against it, showing how to find suitable domain parameters to construct cryptographically strong elliptic curves. This is followed by the discussion of elliptic curve domain parameters which are recommended by current standards. Finally, it introduces the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), the elliptic curve digital signature scheme.


2002 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 127-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Maurer ◽  
Alfred Menezes ◽  
Edlyn Teske

AbstractIn this paper, the authors analyze the Gaudry-Hess-Smart (GHS) Weil descent attack on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for elliptic curves defined over characteristic two finite fields of composite extension degree. For each such field F2N, where N is in [100,600], elliptic curve parameters are identified such that: (i) there should exist a cryptographically interesting elliptic curve E over F2N with these parameters; and (ii) the GHS attack is more efficient for solving the ECDLP in E(F2N) than for solving the ECDLP on any other cryptographically interesting elliptic curve over F2N. The feasibility of the GHS attack on the specific elliptic curves is examined over F2176, F2208, F2272, F2304 and F2368, which are provided as examples in the ANSI X9.62 standard for the elliptic curve signature scheme ECDSA. Finally, several concrete instances are provided of the ECDLP over F2N, N composite, of increasing difficulty; these resist all previously known attacks, but are within reach of the GHS attack.


2010 ◽  
Vol 147 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Diem

AbstractWe study the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem over finite extension fields. We show that for any sequences of prime powers (qi)i∈ℕand natural numbers (ni)i∈ℕwithni⟶∞andni/log (qi)⟶0 fori⟶∞, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem restricted to curves over the fields 𝔽qniican be solved in subexponential expected time (qnii)o(1). We also show that there exists a sequence of prime powers (qi)i∈ℕsuch that the problem restricted to curves over 𝔽qican be solved in an expected time ofe𝒪(log (qi)2/3).


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document