An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (by Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze)

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-52
Author(s):  
Brit Grosskopf ◽  
Rosemarie Nagel
2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Güth ◽  
Kerstin Pull ◽  
Manfred Stadler ◽  
Alexandra K. Zaby

Abstract This paper analyzes blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Considering the transition from one information setting to another suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean’ are implemented more frequently.


1982 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 367-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Güth ◽  
Rolf Schmittberger ◽  
Bernd Schwarze

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron S. Richmond ◽  
Jared Becknell ◽  
Jeanne M. Slattery ◽  
Robin Morgan ◽  
Nathanael Mitchell

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