scholarly journals Higher-Order Evidence and the Normativity of Logic

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-37
Author(s):  
Mattias Skipper
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Normativity Of Logic ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Upshots for Other Debates

2021 ◽  
pp. 281-314
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Dutch Book ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Normativity Of Logic ◽  
Money Pump ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

This chapter explores and draws out the consequences of both the dualist view of rationality defended in Part I and the theory of structural rationality defended in Part II for a series of standing debates in (meta)ethics and epistemology—including debates about moral rationalism, rational choice theory, higher-order evidence, the normativity of logic, epistemic permissivism, and conditionalization. It also considers and criticizes some popular ways of trying to account for the existence and force of coherence requirements in the formally inclined philosophical literature—namely, Dutch book and money pump arguments and accuracy dominance arguments.

Higher-Order Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 312-344
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
Level Splitting ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Chapter 10 explores a puzzle about epistemic akrasia: if you can have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence supports, then your total evidence can make it rationally permissible to be epistemically akratic. Section 10.1 presents the puzzle and three options for solving it: Level Splitting, Downward Push, and Upward Push. Section 10.2 argues that we should opt for Upward Push: you cannot have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence is or what it supports. Sections 10.3 and 10.4 defend Upward Push against David Christensen’s objection that it licenses irrational forms of dogmatism in ideal and nonideal agents alike. Section 10.5 responds to his argument that misleading higher-order evidence generates rational dilemmas in which you’re guaranteed to violate one of the ideals of epistemic rationality. Section 10.6 concludes with some general reflections on the nature of epistemic rationality and the role of epistemic idealization.

Can Your Total Evidence Mislead About Itself?

2019 ◽  
pp. 298-316
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Simple Mathematical Model ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

It’s fairly uncontroversial that you can sometimes get misleading higher-order evidence about what your first-order evidence supports. What is more controversial is whether this can result in a situation where your total evidence is misleading about what your total evidence supports: that is, where your total evidence is misleading about itself. It’s hard to arbitrate on purely intuitive grounds whether any particular example of misleading higher-order evidence is an example of misleading total evidence. This chapter tries to make progress by offering a simple mathematical model that suggests that higher-order evidence will tend to bear more strongly on higher-order propositions about what one’s evidence supports than it does on the corresponding first-order propositions; and then by arguing that given this, it is plausible that there will be some cases of misleading total evidence.

scholarly journals No-Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
NEIL LEVY
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Disadvantaged Groups ◽  
Intellectual Autonomy ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

AbstractNo-platforming—the refusal to allow those who espouse views seen as inflammatory the opportunity to speak in certain forums—is very controversial. Proponents typically cite the possibility of harms to disadvantaged groups and, sometimes, epistemically paternalistic considerations. Opponents invoke the value of free speech and respect for intellectual autonomy in favor of more open speech, arguing that the harms that might arise from bad speech are best addressed by rebuttal, not silencing. In this article, I argue that there is a powerful consideration in favor of no-platforming some speakers: allowing them a platform generates genuine higher-order evidence in favor of their claims. When that higher-order evidence would be misleading, we may reasonably believe it should not be generated.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document