Does autonomous moral reasoning favor consequentialism?

This paper addresses an important issue that has been commonly debated in moral psychology, namely the normative and metaethical implications of our differing intuitive responses to morally indistinguishable dilemmas. The prominent example of the asymmetry in our responses is that people often intuitively accept pulling a switch and deny pushing as a morally permissible way of sacrificing an innocent person to save more innocent people. Joshua Greene traces our negative responses to actions involving “up close and personal” harm back to our evolutionary past and argues that this undermines the normative power of deontological judgments. I reject Greene’s argument by arguing that our theoretical moral intuitions, as opposed to concrete and mid-level ones, are independent of direct evolutionary influence because they are the product of autonomous (gene-independent) moral reasoning. I then explain how both consequentialist and deontological theoretical intuitions, which enable us to make important moral distinctions and grasp objective moral facts, are produced by the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning and the process of cultural evolution. My conclusion will be that Greene is not justified in his claim that deontology is normatively inferior to consequentialism.

The Archangel Delusion. Descriptive Ethics and Its Role in the Education of Ethicists

The role of ethicists is to provide a genuine ethical theory to help non-ethicists interpret and solve moral dilemmas, to define what is right or wrong, and, finally, to clarify moral values. Therefore, ethicists are taught to address morality with rational procedures, to set aside their moral intuitions and emotions. Sometimes, professional ethicists are prone to falling into the archangel delusion – the belief that they are beyond the influence of their own emotions. This can lead to ousting moral intuitions from the space of ethical reflection, thus making ethicists unaware of them. They may treat intuitive beliefs about morality as an expression of primal moral feelings. The main question pursued in this article, is how those feelings may influence moral theories, which should be developed by professional ethicists. Ethicists may provide an ethical theory which is merely a rationalisation and justification for their own suppressed moral emotions, rather than the effect of genuine, rational moral reasoning. To help ethicists cope with this delusion, a model of cooperation between descriptive and normative ethics is proposed. Ethicists should therefore use the research tools of descriptive ethics to determine their own intuitions, and the moral emotions in which these intuitions are grounded. --------------- Received: 09/06/2021. Reviewed: 23/07/2021. Accepted: 13/08/2021.

The Right to Higher Education and the Problem of Unequal Benefits

This chapter turns to the question of who should pay for an education system founded on the right to higher education. First, it explains how moral intuitions about fair funding can challenge the claim that higher education should be allocated as an entitlement or primary good. Second, its show how these intuitions are conventionally justified in terms of a distribution’s effects on socioeconomic equality. Third, it argues that there are also liberty-based reasons for the public to fund higher education. Finally, it shows why these liberty-based reasons take on a special significance in the context of the right to higher education, warranting full public funding so long as two other distributive conditions (non-exclusivity and support for diverse conceptions of the good) are satisfied.

Moral Emotion and Intuition in Organizations

While traditional approaches have described ethical decision-making in organizations mainly as being the result of rational deliberative thought, a steadily growing body of research indicates that moral decision-making is strongly influenced by moral intuitions and emotions. The moral intuition approach typically has two aspects: the process through which moral intuitions emerge and their content. With regard to the process, moral intuitions represent fast, automatic, evaluative reactions that are emotionally charged. An important tenet of moral intuition research refers to the primacy of intuition—the notion that moral intuitions generally drive moral decision-making. Accordingly, moral intuitions are described as starting points for rational reflection processes that follow later. On this basis, it has also been argued that the interplay of moral intuition and deliberation is malleable. Specifically, the well-formed moral intuitions of experts are thought to differ from the naive moral intuitions of novices. With increasing experience and reflection about the moral issues in one’s experiences, deliberation increasingly enables individuals to shift between intuitions and reasoning and to monitor, test, weigh, and reject both intuitions and reasons. The content of moral intuition refers to the foundations of morality, which are the underlying moral domain, specifying what individuals view as morally right or wrong. The most commonly referenced account in this field, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), argues that moral intuitions are a function of evolutionarily developed, innate predispositions to master multiple social problems that interact with social and cultural influences. These predispositions, or moral foundations, include care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity. While empirical work on the role of moral intuition in organizations is still at an early stage, several areas have been identified that may particularly benefit from integrating moral intuition process and content. For instance, the moral intuition perspective can aid the understanding and prevention of processes through which unethical behaviors and practices, such as corruption, may be justified and normalized in organizations. Furthermore, the moral intuition perspective is increasingly used to study the moral leadership process, most notably the link between leader moral foundations and moral leader behaviors, as well as the role of (mis)fit between leader and follower moral foundations. Moral emotions are an inherent element of the moral intuition process and refer to the welfare of others and the promotion of a functioning society. It is thought that individuals experience moral emotions when they or others have violated moral standards. These emotions build the motivational force for moral action and are often placed in five clusters: other‐praising (e.g., gratitude), other‐suffering (e.g., sympathy), other‐condemning (e.g., contempt), self‐condemning (e.g., guilt), and self-approving (e.g., moral pride) moral emotions.

Moral Bioenhancement: Widespread Harm and Broad Cooperation

<p>A controversial issue in contemporary bioethics has emerged in recent years: moral bioenhancement (MB). Human bioenhancement in general has seen its share of controversy, but it is generally agreed that there is potential to improve human physical and mental capacities through biotechnological interventions such as medicinal drugs and genetic modification. The discussion has turned to whether biotechnological interventions could similarly improve human moral capacities. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that MB is imperative if humans are to survive into the future, because our current moral capacities do not equip us to address future catastrophic problems, Ultimate Harm, which will be caused by modern advanced scientific progress. I suggest related but distinct reasons why MB is appealing: scientific progress and deficient human moral capacities are jointly responsible for enormous amounts of harm all over the world, Widespread Harm, and MB has the potential to reduce that harm. Human moral capacities are deficient because of their dependence on what I call ‘moral intuitions’; evolved psychological traits that shape our many societies’ varied moral values, resulting in moral disagreement and the disruption of inter-group cooperation. Addressing modern problems requires a broader level of cooperation that is unlikely to be achieved by depending on our current moral intuitions. This is why our moral capacities should be improved. However, typical accounts of MB do not describe interventions that will improve our moral capacities in this way. They are focused on the vague objective of ‘making people morally better’, assuming that this will address human moral deficiency and that this will in turn address the resulting problems. ‘Making people morally better’ means making them more satisfactory to our current moral intuitions, which are the root of moral deficiency, so these MB strategies are unlikely to be effective. An alternative MB strategy, which I propose, instead focuses on the objective of modifying current moral intuitions so that they promote broad cooperation. This will result in improved moral capacities in the sense that our moral capacities will be more practically useful to us. However, because this strategy disregards the importance of satisfying our current moral intuitions, it will be morally unpalatable. This is its main disadvantage over the typical MB strategy, though it is better at handling many common objections. Ultimately, there are a number of practical concerns that cannot be completely satisfactorily responded to even by my new MB strategy, such as the issues of mandatory MB and of fine-tuning our moral capacities. These concerns may mean that MB is too risky, and therefore not the best course of action in response to modern problems rooted in scientific progress and moral deficiency, particularly since we have promising alternatives available such as traditional moral enhancement techniques and further scientific progress. The prospect of MB should continue to be investigated, but it should focus on improving upon our current problematic moral intuitions rather than better satisfying them.</p>

Moral Bioenhancement: Widespread Harm and Broad Cooperation

<p>A controversial issue in contemporary bioethics has emerged in recent years: moral bioenhancement (MB). Human bioenhancement in general has seen its share of controversy, but it is generally agreed that there is potential to improve human physical and mental capacities through biotechnological interventions such as medicinal drugs and genetic modification. The discussion has turned to whether biotechnological interventions could similarly improve human moral capacities. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued that MB is imperative if humans are to survive into the future, because our current moral capacities do not equip us to address future catastrophic problems, Ultimate Harm, which will be caused by modern advanced scientific progress. I suggest related but distinct reasons why MB is appealing: scientific progress and deficient human moral capacities are jointly responsible for enormous amounts of harm all over the world, Widespread Harm, and MB has the potential to reduce that harm. Human moral capacities are deficient because of their dependence on what I call ‘moral intuitions’; evolved psychological traits that shape our many societies’ varied moral values, resulting in moral disagreement and the disruption of inter-group cooperation. Addressing modern problems requires a broader level of cooperation that is unlikely to be achieved by depending on our current moral intuitions. This is why our moral capacities should be improved. However, typical accounts of MB do not describe interventions that will improve our moral capacities in this way. They are focused on the vague objective of ‘making people morally better’, assuming that this will address human moral deficiency and that this will in turn address the resulting problems. ‘Making people morally better’ means making them more satisfactory to our current moral intuitions, which are the root of moral deficiency, so these MB strategies are unlikely to be effective. An alternative MB strategy, which I propose, instead focuses on the objective of modifying current moral intuitions so that they promote broad cooperation. This will result in improved moral capacities in the sense that our moral capacities will be more practically useful to us. However, because this strategy disregards the importance of satisfying our current moral intuitions, it will be morally unpalatable. This is its main disadvantage over the typical MB strategy, though it is better at handling many common objections. Ultimately, there are a number of practical concerns that cannot be completely satisfactorily responded to even by my new MB strategy, such as the issues of mandatory MB and of fine-tuning our moral capacities. These concerns may mean that MB is too risky, and therefore not the best course of action in response to modern problems rooted in scientific progress and moral deficiency, particularly since we have promising alternatives available such as traditional moral enhancement techniques and further scientific progress. The prospect of MB should continue to be investigated, but it should focus on improving upon our current problematic moral intuitions rather than better satisfying them.</p>

Testing Extended Parallel Processing Model in the Korean COVID-19 Context: Effect of Moral Intuitions as Moderators

Despite the possible social implications of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), previous studies of the extended parallel processing model (EPPM) in the context of COVID-19 overlooked the emotional aspects when processing fear-inducing COVID-19-related messages. Drawing upon the moral foundation theory (MFT), this study aimed to (a) apply EPPM in the Korean COVID-19 context, (b) introduce MFT and explain why moral intuitions can be related to the processing of COVID-19 messages, and (c) examine the moderating role of moral intuitions in the EPPM model. Based on the theoretical backgrounds, this study tested EPPM hypotheses and also tested whether moral intuition can moderate the relationship between perceived self-efficacy, perceived threat, fear of COVID-19, and health compliance behavioral intention. This study conducted an online survey using measurements of perceived self-efficacy, perceived threat, MFQ-20, fear of COVID, and health compliance. Our study showed three main findings. First, our study found the main effects of (a) self-efficacy on health compliance behavioral intention and (b) perceived threat on health compliance behavioral intention. Second, our study found that morality moderated the main effects of self-efficacy or perceived threat and also moderated EPPM interaction on fear of COVID. Third, the moderation of morality in the relationship between self-efficacy and health compliance behavioral intention showed that health compliance intention decreased as morality increased. Our findings suggest that people can consider COVID-19 as a social and moral issue that involves protecting others.

Prolegomenon

Hayek contended that the Open Society has evolved beyond basic human inclinations and capacities. We will consider his three Unsettling Theses. First, that the Open Society is fundamentally at odds with our evolved moral intuitions. Second, that the Open Society’s complexity surpasses our capacity to understand the function and justification of its constitutive rules. Third, that the Open Society has evolved beyond our governance. These concerns apparently manifest in our daily politics. Because of the first, we are constantly tempted to morally renounce, and construct barriers to, The Open Society. Because of the second, our attempts to reflect on and reconstruct its rules generate unrelenting moral conflict. Because of the third, we lack the knowledge to competently improve the functioning of the Open Society, and so we are always disappointed with our politics. Hayek’s diagnoses of these systems, long dismissed, resonate with a large body of contemporary scientific work and thus merit deeper investigation and possible revision. This will be done across inquiries into each one of Hayek’s Unsettling Theses. The first inquiry considers the problem of our evolved moral nature, and whether we are by nature parochial egalitarians who rebel at diversity, inclusion and impartiality. The second inquiry analyses the Open Society itself, particularly its autocatalytic diversity and constant change. The third inquiry focuses on whether the open society is beyond governance.

The Influence of Moral Intuitions on Americans’ Divergent Reactions to Reports of Sexual Assault and Harassment

Drawing on insights from moral psychology, we examine the influence of moral intuitions on Americans’ divergent reactions to reports of sexual assault and harassment. We hypothesize that Americans whose moral intuitions emphasize care and protection of the vulnerable will show a greater willingness to believe reports of sexual assault and harassment, while those whose moral intuitions emphasize social order and cohesion will show greater skepticism toward such reports. Using data from a nationally representative sample of USA adults ( N =1050), we find strong support for both hypotheses. We also find that the influence of moral intuitions on reactions to reports of sexual assault and harassment is partially mediated by respondents’ willingness to attribute responsibility to victims of sex crimes. Our results hold when females and males are examined separately. The study provides compelling evidence that a moral intuitionist approach is useful for understanding Americans’ divergent reactions to reports of sexual assault and harassment.

Narrative Media’s Emphasis on Distinct Moral Intuitions Alters Early Adolescents’ Judgments

Logic from the model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME) suggests that narrative media emphasizing moral intuitions can increase the salience of those intuitions in audiences. To date, support for this logic has been limited to adults. Across two studies, the present research tested MIME predictions in early adolescents (ages 10–14). The salience of care, fairness, loyalty, and authority intuitions was manipulated in a pilot study with verbal prompts ( N = 87) and in the main study with a comic book ( N = 107). In both studies, intuition salience was measured after induction. The pilot study demonstrated that exposure to verbal prompts emphasizing care, fairness, and loyalty increased the salience of their respective intuitions. The main study showed that exposure to comic books emphasizing all four separate intuitions increased salience of their respective intuitions in early adolescents. Results are discussed in terms of relevance for the MIME and understanding narrative media’s influence on children’s moral judgments.