Informal Fallacies

2016 ◽  
pp. 58-111
Keyword(s):  
Informal Fallacies

Deductivism and the Informal Fallacies

Argumentation ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Jacquette
Keyword(s):  
Informal Fallacies

scholarly journals Commitment, Types of Dialogue, and Fallacies

1992 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Walton
Keyword(s):  
Slippery Slope ◽  
Ad Hominem ◽  
Normative Framework ◽  
Informal Fallacies

This paper, based on research in a forthcoming monograph, Commitment in Dialogue, undertaken jointly with Erik Krabbe, explains several informal fallacies as shifts from one type of dialogue to another. The normative framework is that of a dialogue where two parties reason together, incurring and retracting commitments to various propositions as the dialogue continues. The fallacies studied include the ad hominem, the slippery slope, and many questions.

Informal Fallacies

1987 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas N. Walton
Keyword(s):  
Informal Fallacies

Depression, Informal Fallacies, and Cognitive Therapy

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Irwin ◽  
Gregory Bassham ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Therapy ◽  
Informal Fallacies

A NOTE ON INFORMAL FALLACIES

Mind ◽  
1965 ◽  
Vol LXXIV (295) ◽  
pp. 432-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD COLE
Keyword(s):  
Informal Fallacies

scholarly journals Reasoning Under Uncertainty: The Role of Two Informal Fallacies in an Emerging Scientific Inquiry

2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Cummings
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Epistemic Uncertainty ◽  
Contextual Approach ◽  
Reasoning Under Uncertainty ◽  
Informal Fallacies ◽  
Epistemic Context ◽  
Pragmatic Turn

lt is now commonplace in fallacy inquiry for many of the traditional informal fallacies to be viewed as reasonable or nonfallacious modes of argument. Central to this evaluative shift has been the attempt to examine traditional fallacies within their wider contexts of use. However, this pragmatic turn in fallacy evaluation is still in its infancy. The true potential of a contextual approach in the evaluation of the fallacies is yet to be explored. I examine how, in the context of scientific inquiry, certain traditional fallacies function by conferring epistemic gains upon inquiry. Specifically, I argue that these fallacies facilitate the progression of inquiry, particularly in the initial stages ofinquiry when the epistemic context is one of uncertainty. The conception of these fallacies that emerges is that of heuristics of reasoning in contexts of epistemic uncertainty.

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