The Relationship between Critical Thinking, Frequency, Informal Fallacy and Evidence in Argumentative Writing

The present study was an investigation of the relationship between the EFL learners’ critical thinking, their frequency, and types of informal fallacy and evidence in argumentative writing. Few studies have been conducted to investigate these issues. To this end, 356-second grade female senior state high school students from four schools in Zanjan were selected through multistage cluster random sampling (MCRS) method and based on Cambridge placement test (2010); 130 students proved to be upper-intermediate and participated in this correlational study. The main data collection stage took place for one month. Then, the informal fallacies based on Johnson's definitions and four types of evidence categorized in Hoeke and Hustinkx were identified and counted within language learners' argumentative writings. The evaluation of the arguments was also conducted based on Walton, Reed, and Macagno. Based on the results achieved from the first research question, there was a significant negative correlation observed between the participants' critical thinking and the frequency of use of informal fallacies in their written argumentation. Based on the results achieved from the second research question, there was a potential and significant correlation between the participants' critical thinking and the frequency of use of informal fallacies. Keywords: Argumentative Writing, Critical Thinking, Evidence, Informal Fallacy.

The First Paralogism

This chapter addresses a range of questions relating to the Paralogisms in general and the first Paralogism in particular. In particular it is asked: What is Kant’s notion of a paralogism? and How is transcendental illusion supposed to operate in the first paralogism? The answer to the first of these questions is surprising. Kant understands a paralogism as an argument that has true premises but is ‘false with respect to form’. But, crucially, he understands falsity with respect to form more expansively than as formal invalidity: arguments that are ‘false with respect to form’ include certain informal fallacies, including the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi—a fallacy of overestimation of the strength of one’s proven conclusion. This explains how it could be that the A-edition first paralogism is ‘false with respect to form’ (as a paralogism must, by definition, be) even though it is not in fact an invalid argument.

Teaching for Intellectual Virtue in Logic and Critical Thinking Classes

Introductory-level undergraduate classes in Logic or Critical Thinking are a staple in the portfolio of many Philosophy programs. A standard approach to these classes is to include teaching and learning activities focused on formal deductive and inductive logic, sometimes accompanied by teaching and learning activities focused on informal fallacies or argument construction. In this article, I discuss a proposal to include an additional element within these classes—namely, teaching and learning activities focused on intellectual virtues. After clarifying the proposal, I identify three reasons in favor of implementing it and I discuss how to implement it, focusing on questions about pedagogical strategies and pedagogical resources.

Introduction to Informal Logical Fallacies from Islamic Perspective

This work is aimed at providing an Islamic perspective on few selected informal logical fallacies. It serves an introduction to the theme and opens ways of reflecting on it, which is the main portion of critical thinking as a subject. Informal logical fallacies are numerous innumber and for the sake of convenience they are very often categorized under three classifications: relevance, presumption, and ambiguity. This work follows the same categories and discusses few, selected informal fallacies under each category.