Compulsory licensing of intellectual property: A viable policy lever for promoting access to critical technologies?

2014 ◽  
pp. 109-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. McManis ◽  
Jorge L. Contreras
2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-84
Author(s):  
Kyung-Bok Son

Compulsory licensing (CL), provided by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, enables countries, including high-income countries, to ensure the protection of public health in the context of stringent intellectual property regimes. This study investigated associations between the time to attempted CL and a series of factors at the drug and country level. We used a dataset of all attempted CL that occurred from 1995 to 2014, calculated the duration as the difference in years between the year of global marketing of a certain drug and the year of attempted CL in a certain country, and applied a nonparametric event history model. We found that the Doha Declaration was quite effective in shortening the time to attempted CL. Additionally, even though global justice movements have encouraged some countries to attempt CL for various medicines since 2012, the time to CL attempts in this period became significantly longer compared to those that occurred immediately after the Doha Declaration. Our findings show that the subject of CL has not successfully expanded to oncology medicines from HIV/AIDS medicines and that recently approved medicines are not yet subjects of CL. Furthermore, our duration model suggests a learning-by-doing effect in attempting CL: previous experience of CL not only triggers CL for the same drugs in other countries but also accelerates CL for other drugs within the country.


2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-33
Author(s):  
Franco Cugno ◽  
Elisabetta Ottoz

A common argument against compulsory licensing of intellectual property maintains that it facilitates the entry of inefficient producers, which may reduce social welfare independently of any effects on R&D incentives. We study the issue in a model where the innovative firm, under the threat of compulsory licensing, reacts strategically by choosing between quantity and price competition. We show that the risk of a reduction in static welfare due to the entry of highly inefficient firms is avoided if licensing entails a royalty per unit of output and no fixed fees. The rationale behind this result lies in the fact that compulsory licensing threat works as a disciplining device to improve static social welfare, even when the applicant is a high cost inefficient firm. JEL codes: KOO, L49, 034.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-21
Author(s):  
Ian Hyde

Author(s):  
Jatinder Maan ◽  
Dinesh Kumar

The issue of patenting is a contentious issue. Different stakeholders hold opposite views. The pharmaceutical giants demand for stricter and longer Intellectual Property Protection for the promotion of research and development. They contend IP protection to be the “bedrock of their business”. While the health activists and governments of developing nations want greater flexibility in intellectual property protection and shorter patent period protection. Article 31 of the TRIPs agreement provides certain flexibilities to cater to certain situations. The countries are free to determine the grounds to issue provisions like compulsory licensing. But despite the provisions very few countries have used them. Pharmaceuticals giants with the backing of developed countries always try to denounce the practice of compulsory licensing with economic and political pressure. This chapter explains the concept and significance of Intellectual Property with reference to Pharmaceuticals. It also traces the little history of TRIPs agreement and explains the concept of Compulsory Licensing with trends in its use. It also discusses the few instances where compulsory License has been issued in different countries and tries to find the reasons of non issuance of Compulsory License.


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