The Argument from Analogy in the Apology of St. Theophilus of Antioch “To Autolycus”

In this paper a hybrid model of argument from analogy is presented that combines argumentation schemes and story schemes. One premise of the argumentation scheme for argument from analogy in the model claims that one case is similar to another. Story schemes are abstract representations of stories (narratives, explanations) based on common knowledge about how sequences of actions and events we are familiar with can normally be expected to unfold. Story schemes are used (a) to model similarity between two cases, and (2) as the basis of evidence to support the similarity premise of an argument from analogy. Four examples of argument from analogy are used to test the theory.

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Conclusion

Morality and Epistemic Judgement ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0011 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 213-218

Author(s):

Christopher Cowie

Keyword(s):

Error Theory ◽

Reasons For Action ◽

Reasons For Belief ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Moral Error ◽

Epistemic Consequentialism ◽

Argument From Analogy ◽

Moral Properties ◽

Categorical Reasons

The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.

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The Analogy

Morality and Epistemic Judgement ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0002 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 30-54

Author(s):

Christopher Cowie

Keyword(s):

Error Theory ◽

Strong Case ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Moral Error ◽

Argument From Analogy

The argument from analogy is presented in a favourable light in order to properly assess it. It is comprised of two premises. According to the parity premise, the arguments for a moral error theory would entail an epistemic error theory. According to the epistemic existence premise an epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that the parity premise can be given two readings. The first reading—internalism-parity—targets the internalism-based moral error theory. The second reading—irreducibility-parity—targets the irreducibility-based moral error theory. Both readings are motivated. It is claimed that they are plausible and that the argument from analogy represents a strong case against the moral error theory.

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