What echolocation does and doesn’t mean for language

There is an argument from analogy that goes like this: echolocation is a cognitive specialization in bats and language is similarly a cognitive specialization in humans; consequently, because echolocation is a trait that is the result of natural selection, the language faculty must also be. I show that echolocation is a latent ability in humans which cannot have been selected for, i.e., it is a spandrel. This turns the tables on the argument from analogy, showing that either the analogy was false, or that the correct conclusion is that the language faculty is likely a spandrel. I then argue that natural selection of a propensity to notice and attend to the relevant input is likely to have led to the language faculty.

Conclusion

The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.

The Analogy

The argument from analogy is presented in a favourable light in order to properly assess it. It is comprised of two premises. According to the parity premise, the arguments for a moral error theory would entail an epistemic error theory. According to the epistemic existence premise an epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that the parity premise can be given two readings. The first reading—internalism-parity—targets the internalism-based moral error theory. The second reading—irreducibility-parity—targets the irreducibility-based moral error theory. Both readings are motivated. It is claimed that they are plausible and that the argument from analogy represents a strong case against the moral error theory.

Morality and Epistemic Judgement

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist. As a consequence those judgments – and those of us who make them – are systematically mistaken. This is the moral error theory. One of the most interesting and important reasons for rejecting it is that its truth would entail a highly implausible error theory of epistemic judgments. These are judgments about what one ought to believe given one’s evidence. This is the argument from analogy. The aim of this book is to systematise and assess it. It is argued that it fails. The analogy between moral judgment and epistemic judgment is misconceived. The moral error theory could yet be true.

Introduction

The moral error theory—i.e. moral judgements attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, and as a consequence those judgements are systematically mistaken—and the argument from analogy—the argument for thinking that morality is systematically mistaken in this way—are introduced. Interest in the argument from analogy is motivated by situating it within recent trends in both moral philosophy and epistemology. A roadmap for the book is provided. The conclusion of the book is outlined: it is that the argument from analogy fails. It is not inferred from this that the moral error theory is true. The arguments do not lead to this conclusion. But the book does claim that—for now at least—we do not know that the argument from analogy is false.

The Normativity of Evidence

Any case against the argument from analogy appears to rely on the assumption that the evidential-support relation is not itself a normative relation. This chapter identifies three ways in which one might challenge this assumption and responds to each. In doing so it claims that existing responses to this problem in the literature are insufficient: they rely on objective conceptions of probability that are ill-suited to account for epistemic probabilities. It claims that epistemic error theorists may be forced to deny that there are any evidential-support relations but that, surprisingly, this is less of a concession than it may at first appear.

Analogical Arguments in Persuasive and Deliberative Contexts

This paper uses argumentation tools such as argument diagrams and argumentation schemes to analyze four examples of argument from analogy, and argues that to proceed from there to evaluating these arguments, features of the context of dialogue need to be taken into account. The evidence drawn from these examples is taken to support a pragmatic approach to studying argument from analogy, meaning that identifying the logical form of the argument by building an argument diagram of the premises and conclusion is not by itself sufficient for argument evaluation. To get further, it is argued, the argument evaluator needs to take into account how this particular argument was used in context to support a conversational goal.Cet article utilise des outils d'argumentation tels que des diagrammes d'argument et des schèmes d'argumentation pour analyser trois exemples d'argument par analogie, et soutient que pour évaluer ces arguments de manière adéquate, il est nécessaire de tenir compte du contexte d'utilisation de l'argument. Ces exemples suggèrent que l’étude des arguments par analogie à partir de seulement l’identification de leur forme logique (par exemple en construisant un diagramme des prémisses et de leur conclusion) n'est pas adéquate. Pour aller plus loin, on avance que l'analyste d'argument doit prendre en compte comment un argument particulier a été utilisé dans un contexte pour soutenir un but conversationnel.