Conclusion

The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.

Against Irreducibility-Parity

It is argued that the second version of the parity premise—irreducibility-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements, unlike moral judgements, are committed to merely reducibly normative properties. The argument for this is based on the same basic rationale outlined in chapter 3: epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law. A ‘back-up’ view is introduced: even if irreducibility-parity is true, the analogy between epistemic judgements and normative or evaluative judgements within institutions can yet be used to render the epistemic error theory less implausible than it may at first appear.

Against Internalism-Parity

An alternative argument is provided for rejecting internalism-parity. It is claimed that, from the perspective of internalism-based moral error theorists, categorical reasons for action are more problematic than categorical reasons for belief. This is because there are considerably stronger arguments for thinking that one’s reasons for action are constitutively dependent on one’s desires than for thinking that one’s reasons for belief are constitutively dependent on one’s desires. Three such arguments are considered: from action-explanation, from reasoning, and from paradigmatic-ascriptions. It is claimed that the first of these three arguments clearly does not apply to reasons for belief as to reasons for action. The applicability of the second and third arguments is harder to ascertain.

Against Internalism-Parity

It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral judgements, by contrast, are committed to the existence of genuinely normative reasons. This claim is defended by appeal to the basic rationale that epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law, but moral judgements are not. It is argued that this does not render epistemic norms merely conventional in an objectionable sense.

The Analogy

The argument from analogy is presented in a favourable light in order to properly assess it. It is comprised of two premises. According to the parity premise, the arguments for a moral error theory would entail an epistemic error theory. According to the epistemic existence premise an epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that the parity premise can be given two readings. The first reading—internalism-parity—targets the internalism-based moral error theory. The second reading—irreducibility-parity—targets the irreducibility-based moral error theory. Both readings are motivated. It is claimed that they are plausible and that the argument from analogy represents a strong case against the moral error theory.

Moral Error Theory

Two varieties of moral error theory are identified. According to the first—the internalism-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of categorical normative reasons for action. These are incompatible with plausible constraints on the relationship between one’s reasons and one’s psychology. So they do not exist. According to the second—the irreducibility-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of irreducibly normative properties and relations. These are incompatible with plausible assumptions about the constituents of the world. So they do not exist. The differences and commonalities between these two varieties of moral error theory are identified.

Introduction

The moral error theory—i.e. moral judgements attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, and as a consequence those judgements are systematically mistaken—and the argument from analogy—the argument for thinking that morality is systematically mistaken in this way—are introduced. Interest in the argument from analogy is motivated by situating it within recent trends in both moral philosophy and epistemology. A roadmap for the book is provided. The conclusion of the book is outlined: it is that the argument from analogy fails. It is not inferred from this that the moral error theory is true. The arguments do not lead to this conclusion. But the book does claim that—for now at least—we do not know that the argument from analogy is false.

Error Theory and Thought

It has been argued that the epistemic error theory is incompatible with the ‘essentially normative’ nature of belief itself. Two versions of this objection to the epistemic error theory are presented. Neither is found to be plausible. The most plausible is based on the view that the concept of belief is essentially normative. It is claimed that this view is under-motivated and would, in any case, be unlikely to cause the problems for epistemic error theorists that it is sometimes claimed to. Some alternative objections to the epistemic error theory based on the nature of thought and deliberation are briefly considered.

The Conventionalism Criticism

It is sometimes claimed that ‘belief aims at truth’ in a sense that explains the existence and nature of epistemic norms. Furthermore it is sometimes claimed that there is no analogous explanation of moral norms. In this chapter it is asked whether these claims represent an alternative means of rejecting the parity premise to the basic rationale—comparing epistemic judgements to normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—offered in chapters 3 and 5. It is argued that they do not. Three different readings of ‘belief aims at truth’ are identified. None are found to be plausible as an alternative route to rejection of the parity premise.

A Puzzling Combination

In this chapter it is supposed that the arguments of all previous chapters have failed. It is supposed that epistemic reasons are genuinely and irreducibly normative, and that the epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that this could still be compatible with the moral error theory. This is referred to as ‘the puzzling combination’. The puzzling combination will be possible in the event that moral error theorists argue for their view by appeal to ‘debunking and dispensability’ arguments. Some basic objections to these arguments are discussed. The moves that would need to be made if ‘debunking and dispensability’ arguments were to be successful in defence of the puzzling combination are articulated.