A defence of Locke’s consent theory against Hume’s critique

Author(s):  
Takumichi Kojo
Keyword(s):  
JAMA ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 303 (24) ◽  
pp. 2529
Author(s):  
Robert M. Veatch

1991 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 676-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko

It is commonly held that theories of political obligation based on consent, whether express or tacit, cannot account for most people's obligations; that political obligations generally stem from being born into specific societies rather than from voluntary choice. In recent years, consent theorists have turned to ‘reformist’ consent, arguing that consent theory could be rescued if political institutions were reformed to allow the possibility of widespread consent. Various possible reforms are examined and shown to be inadequate. The most obvious mechanism, ‘consent-or-leave’, is disqualified because it is coercive. Other mechanisms would be unable to induce widespread consent while preserving consent's essential voluntary character. I refer to the most plausible model as ‘Hobbes's choice’, though because it must unacceptably limit non-consentors' ability to defend themselves, it too is unsatisfactory.


Author(s):  
Keith Hyams

This chapter discusses the justifications for political obligation. The most important historical justification for political obligation is what is often called consent theory or contract theory. Consent theorists claim that we should obey the law because we have consented to do so. Meanwhile, the theorist H. L. A. Hart argues that if we accept a benefit, then it is only fair that we should reciprocate and give something back; if we enjoy the protection of police and armies, if we use roads, hospitals, schools, and other government-run services, then we should reciprocate by obeying the law. Other theorists argue that political obligation is something that we are bound by simply for being a member of a political community. If we cannot justify an obligation to obey the law, then we may have to adopt some form of philosophical anarchism — the view that we have no obligation to obey the law.


1993 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard R. Boxill
Keyword(s):  

1986 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett
Keyword(s):  

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