2006 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 988-1004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic S Mishkin

This review essay examines whether too-big-to-fail is as serious a problem as Gary Stern and Ron Feldman contend. This essay argues that Stern and Feldman overstate the importance of the too-big-to-fail problem and do not give enough credit to the FDICIA legislation of 1991 for improving bank regulation and supervision. However, this criticism of the Stern and Feldman book does not detract from many of its messages. The policy recommendations in their book have merit even if the too-big-to-fail problem is currently not that serious because these policies make it less likely that a banking crisis will occur even if driven by other factors.


2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (-1) ◽  
pp. 29-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Minford
Keyword(s):  

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Beccalli ◽  
Saverio Bozzolan ◽  
Andrea Menini ◽  
Philip Molyneux

Author(s):  
Max Breitenlechner ◽  
Daniel Gründler ◽  
Gabriel P Mathy ◽  
Johann Scharler

Abstract At the peak of the Great Depression in mid-1931, Germany experienced a severe banking crisis. We study to what extent credit constraints contributed to the downturn by fitting a structural vector autoregressive model with data from January 1925 to September 1935. Adverse credit supply shocks contributed strongly to the downturn especially at the time of the 1931 banking crisis. Before that, credit supply shocks had also contributed to the expansion phase preceding the depression. We also find that aggregate demand and U.S. business cycle shocks were the primary drivers of the German Great Depression.


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