The Burden of Proof in EU Competition Enforcement

Author(s):  
Geoffrey Parker ◽  
Georgios Petropoulos ◽  
Marshall Van Alstyne

Abstract Should internet era merger policy differ from industrial era merger policy? Platform ecosystems rely on economies of scale, data-driven economies of scope, high-quality algorithmic systems, and strong network effects that frequently promote winner-take-most markets. Their market dominance has generated competition concerns that appear difficult to assess with traditional merger policy tools. This paper examines the acquisition strategies of the five major U.S. platforms—Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft—since their inception. We discuss the main merger and acquisition theories of harm and how these operate differently than in the past. To address merger and acquisition concerns of multi-sided platforms, we develop four proposals that incorporate (i) a new ex ante regulatory framework, (ii) an update of the conditions under which the notification of mergers should be compulsory and the burden of proof should be reversed, (iii) differential regulatory priorities in investigating horizontal versus vertical acquisitions, and (iv) an update of competition enforcement tools to increase visibility into market data and trends.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-257
Author(s):  
Svetlana B. Avdasheva ◽  
Svetlana V. Golovanova

A judicial review of the infringement decisions of the competition authority substantially affects the standard of evidence in competition enforcement as well as the structure of cases that the competition authority takes. Enforcement against concerted practice in Russia represents a case-study of interaction between commercial courts of first instance, the Highest Court, the competition authority as enforcer, market participants and the legislator to influence the standards of liability under investigation of concerted practice. We examine the judicial review of infringement decisions on concerted practice and track the evolution of legal definition and sufficiency of evidence in such cases. We show, first, that in Russian enforcement, the ability of the Highest Court to influence the criteria of first instance courts is limited (in contrast to the ability of the first instance court to influence the strategy of enforcement by the competition authority). Second, the increase in the burden of proof motivates the competition authority to refrain from an investigation of concerted practice, in accordance with the prediction of the model of the selection of enforcement target by reputation-maximizing authority.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin

The CSI Effect posits that exposure to television programs that portray forensic science (e.g., CSI: Crime Scene Investigation) can change the way jurors evaluate forensic evidence. The most commonly researched hypothesis under the CSI Effect suggests that shows like CSI depict an unrealistically high standard of forensic science and thus unreasonably inflate the expectations of jurors. Jurors are thus more likely to vote to acquit, and prosecutors face higher burden of proof. We review (1) the theory behind the CSI Effect, (2) the perception of the effect among legal actors, (3) the academic treatment of the effect, and (4) how courts have dealt with the effect. We demonstrate that while legal actors do see the CSI Effect as a serious issue, there is virtually no empirical evidence suggesting it is a real phenomenon. Moreover, many of the remedies employed by courts may do no more than introduce bias into juror decision making or even trigger the CSI Effect when it would not normally occur (i.e., the self-fulfilling prophesy). We end with suggestions for the proper treatment of the CSI Effect in courts, and directions for future scholarly work.


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