Alfred F. MacKay., Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice A Case Study in the Philosophy of Economic

1982 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-92
Author(s):  
Debra C. Rosenthal ◽  
Author(s):  
Conal Duddy ◽  
Ashley Piggins

Kenneth Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem is rightly considered to be a landmark result in economic theory. It is a far-reaching result with implications not just for economics but for political science, philosophy, and many other fields. It has inspired an enormous literature, “social choice theory,” which lies on the interface of economics, politics, and philosophy. Arrow first proved the impossibility theorem in his doctoral dissertation—Social Choice and Individual Values—published in 1951. It is a remarkable result, and had Arrow not proved it, it is unlikely that the theorem would be known today. A social choice is simply a choice made by, or on behalf of, a group of people. Arrow’s theorem is concerned more specifically with the following problem. Suppose that we have a given set of options to choose from and that each member of a group of individuals has his or her own preference over these options. By what method should we construct a single ranking of the options for the group as a whole? Any such method may be represented mathematically by a “social welfare function.” This is a function that receives as its input the preference ordering of each individual and then generates as its output a social preference ordering. Arrow defined some properties that would seem to be essential to any reasonable social welfare function. These properties are called “unrestricted domain,” “weak Pareto,” “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” and “non-dictatorship.” Each of these properties, when taken alone, does appear to be very necessary indeed. Yet, Arrow proved that these properties are in fact mutually incompatible. This troubling fact has been central to the study of social choice ever since.


1981 ◽  
Vol 91 (361) ◽  
pp. 262
Author(s):  
Robert Sugden ◽  
Alfred F. Mackay

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald G. Saari

We develop a geometric approach to identify all possible profiles that support specified votes for separate initiatives or for a bundled bill. This disaggregation allows us to compute the likelihood of different scenarios describing how voters split over the alternatives and to offer new interpretations for pairwise voting. The source of the problems—an unanticipated loss of available information—also explains a variety of other phenomena, such as Simpson’s paradox (a statistical paradox in which the behavior of the “parts” disagrees with that of the “whole”) and Arrow’s theorem from social choice.


1992 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Radcliff

The concept of the General Will has been criticized as being either tyrannical or empirically unattainable. From a social choice perspective, Riker (1982) and others have merged the substance of both perspectives. The new argument maintains that Arrow's Theorem and similar impossibility results imply that the General Will is both dangerous and “intellectually absurd.” While not denying the relevance of the collective choice literature, it is argued that such apocalyptic conclusions are premature.


1983 ◽  
Vol 33 (130) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Lanning Sowden ◽  
Alfred F. Mackay

1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 218-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Scott ◽  
Erik K. Antonsson

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