Blockchain networks as constitutional and competitive polycentric orders

Institutional economists have analyzed permissionless blockchains as a novel institutional building block for voluntary economic exchange and distributed governance, with their unique protocol features such as automated contract execution, high levels of network and process transparency, and uniquely distributed governance. But such institutional analysis needs to be complemented by polycentric analysis of how blockchains change. We characterize such change as resulting from internal sources and external sources. Internal sources include constitutional (protocol) design and collective-choice processes for updating protocols, which help coordinate network participants and users. External sources include competitive pressure from other cryptocurrency networks. By studying two leading networks, Bitcoin and Ethereum, we illustrate how conceptualizing blockchains as competing and constitutional polycentric enterprises clarifies their processes of change.

Methodology for selecting corporate information systems in the conditions of digital transformation of a defence company

A methodology of expert analysis of the market of alternative corporate information systems (CIS) is proposed in order to choose the platform for creating a CIS that fully meets the requirements of a particular defence company. The proposed methodology is based on a set of adapted methods of the decision support theory applied to the problems of multi-criteria collective choice of alternatives.

TANTANGAN PENANGANAN PERMUKIMAN KUMUH DARI SUDUT PANDANG INSTITUSIONAL: STUDI KASUS KOLEKTIF DI KEL. BINTARO DAN KEL. BANJAR KOTA MATARAM

Slum settlement in Indonesia has been improved through various programs since before independence. The experiences of slum improvement programs show that there are still a number of challenges to perfecting them. The most critical issues have been, or related to, tenure security and the sustainability of the holistic slum management program. This research was conducted with a qualitative research approach using The Three Worlds of Action framework and a collective case study method conducted in Kel. Bintaro and Kel. Banjar of the City of Mataram. The results showed that the challenges faced at the constitutional choice level and the collective choice level, namely the policies that have been applied at the national level, have not been fully consistent and coherent with decisions at the operational choice level. This is because policies at the constitutional level are still sectoral in nature, and there is no special institution dealing with slum settlements. The second challenge is that the collective choice that has been prepared at the collective choice level has not been fully operationalized at the operational level. This is because community involvement has not been optimal from planning to implementation and the collective choice has not fully paid attention to aspects of security of residence and sustainability. Keywords: slum improvement program; The Three Worlds of Action; Kelurahan Bintaro dan Kelurahan Banjar Kota Mataram. AbstrakPemukiman kumuh di Indonesia telah ditangani melalui berbagai program sejak sebelum kemerdekaan. Pengalaman program penanganan permukiman kumuh menunjukkan bahwa masih terdapat sejumlah tantangan untuk menyempurnakan program-program dimaksud. Beberapa di antaranya terkait kepastian bermukim dan keberlanjutan program penanganan permukiman kumuh yang holistik. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan pendekatan penelitian kualitatif dengan menggunakan kerangka kerja The Three Worlds of Action dan metode studi kasus kolektif yang dilakukan di Kel. Bintaro dan Kel. Banjar Kota Mataram. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa tantangan yang dihadapi pada tingkat pilihan konstitusional dan tingkat pilihan kolektif, yaitu kebijakan yang telah diterapkan di tingkat nasional, belum sepenuhnya konsisten dan koheren dengan keputusan di tingkat pilihan operasional. Hal ini disebabkan karena kebijakan di tingkat konstitusi masih bersifat sektoral, dan belum ada institusi khusus yang menangani permukiman kumuh. Tantangan kedua, pilihan kolektif yang telah disusun pada level pilihan kolektif belum sepenuhnya dioperasionalkan pada level operasional. Hal ini dikarenakan pelibatan masyarakat belum optimal dari perencanaan hingga pelaksanaan dan pilihan kolektif belum sepenuhnya memperhatikan aspek keamanan bertempat tinggal dan keberlanjutan.

The organizations management multi-criteria objects aggregate rating construction

The article deals with the higher education institutions national aggregate rating constructing problem. This task is relevant in terms of improving management processes in educational organizations. This problem is formulated as a collective choice problem. Proposed to use voting in small groups as aggregation procedures, which satisfies the Condorcet principle. Three collective choice rules description is given in the paper. Obtained on the Bord, Copeland and Kemeny basis procedure salternatives final orderings stability is illustrated by concrete examples. The empirical mean is considered as a Kemeny median approximation. The Bord procedure instability with respect to changes in the initial scores obtained by universities in the ranking mechanisms under consideration is illustrated by examples. This paper presents the results of applying the described small-group voting procedures to a limited sample. This sample consists of data from 15 higher educational institutions from one of the Russian Federation regions. Universities constructed three aggregated ranks proximity degree was evaluated using two metrics - Kendall's rank correlation coefficient and Kemeny's distance. Based on the obtained results comparative analysis, it was made a conclusion about the expediency of using Condorcet-consistent collective selection procedures when constructing educational organizations aggregate ranking.

The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement

Collective choice mechanisms are used by groups to reach decisions in the presence of diverging preferences. But can the employed mechanism affect the degree of post-decision actual agreement (i.e. preference homogeneity) within a group? And if so, which are the features of the choice mechanisms that matter? Since it is difficult to address these questions in natural settings, we employ a theory-driven experiment where, after the group collectively decides on an issue, individual preferences can be properly elicited. We find that decision mechanisms that promote consensual behaviour generate substantially higher levels of post-decision actual agreement compared to outcome-wise identical procedures that incentivize subjects to exaggerate their differences.

Systems of Complexity

Every day people make decisions, from trivial to critical, just as organizations. Groups making decisions commonly have some rules guiding their approach—bylaws, constitutions, or just custom. Each approach can be vague and subject to different interpretation and also manipulation. This chapter starts off our discussion about how to make better choices, individually but primarily in groups where the preferences of multiple individuals must somehow be combined to create a collective choice. Decision making on consequential matters often come down to making tradeoffs. Becoming better off on one dimension might mean becoming worse off on another. These decisions are innately matters of sacrifices and compromises. Both systems analysis and social choice analysis focus on how to make these types of tradeoffs. These issues form our goals for this book—how to help organizations make better decisions, by focusing on all three of the key issues: who gets to decide, how do they decide, and what should they decide.