Ties of blood and empire: New Zealand's involvement in Middle East defence and the Suez crisis, 1947-57

1995 ◽  
Vol 32 (08) ◽  
pp. 32-4650-32-4650
Keyword(s):  
2005 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-276
Author(s):  
MAGNUS P. S. PERSSON

Youssef Chatani, Dissension among Allies: Ernest Bevin's Palestine Policy between Whitehall and the White House, 1945–1947 (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 156 pp., £25.00 (hb), ISBN 0–86356–999.Moshe Gat, Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964–1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War (London: Praeger, 2003), 216 pp., £39.99 (hb), ISBN 0–27597–514–2.Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East, 2nd edn (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 684 pp., £19.95 (pb), ISBN 1–86064–811–8.Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 1952–1967: From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six Day War (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 308 pp., £65.00 (hb), ISBN 0–71465–397–7.Jonathan Pearson, Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 252 pp., £52.50 (hb), ISBN 0–33398–451–X.


Author(s):  
Dina Rezk

This introductory chapter outlines how intelligence on the Middle East was gathered and assessed on both sides of the Atlantic and reveals the challenges posed by the legacy of the Suez Crisis. It details the book’s key research questions, sources and historiographical debates. Exploring an atmosphere of widespread hostility towards Nasser, it shows how analysts underestimated the degree to which the Suez debacle had thrust President Nasser to the unrivalled leadership of Arab nationalism. As the stability of the Arab world appeared to unravel, the stage was set for a series of dramatic confrontations between Western powers and the Egyptian president in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.


Author(s):  
Muhamad Hasrul Bin Zakariah

British involvement in Middle East politics can be traced to long before the First World War when its economic and strategic interests appeared to be the main reason for the involvement. The emergence of the newly created Israeli state, following the Balfour Declaration, marked the beginning of the Palestinian refugee crisis. Between 1948 and 1956, historical liability and obligation forced the British to be involved in providing humanitarian aid to the Palestinian refugees. British involvement in the Suez Crisis later in 1956, was a tragedy for British influence in the Middle East. Many scholars concluded that the 1956 campaign marked “the end of British empire in the Middle East” and the beginning of the cold war, American-Soviet rivalry that left Britain marginalised. Even prominent Middle East scholars such as Michael Ben Oren, in his book Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of Modern Middle East, did not give attention to the British role and involvement in the 1967 crisis. However, the British efforts to regain Arab trust whilst preserving its economic and strategic interests in the Middle East persuaded Britain to remain involved with the Palestinian refugee crisis. None of these scholars have tried to analyse the motives behind continued British involvement in humanitarian aid for Palestinian refugees – the crisis which lingers long after the end of the British Empire in the Middle East. This paper discusses this topic with a focus on refugees from the 1967 war and attempts to explain the reasons for continuation of British aid from an historical perspective. This research was based on historical document analysis and the extraction of archival sources from The National Archive (TNA) in London.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document