scholarly journals Intuitionistic Choice and Restricted Classical Logic

2000 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Kohlenbach

Recently, Coquand and Palmgren considered systems of intuitionistic arithmetic<br />in all finite types together with various forms of the axiom of choice and<br />a numerical omniscience schema (NOS) which implies classical logic for arithmetical<br />formulas. Feferman subsequently observed that the proof theoretic<br />strength of such systems can be determined by functional interpretation based<br />on a non-constructive mu-operator and his well-known results on the strength<br />of this operator from the 70's.<br />In this note we consider a weaker form LNOS (lesser numerical omniscience<br />schema) of NOS which suffices to derive the strong form of binary K¨onig's<br />lemma studied by Coquand/Palmgren and gives rise to a new and mathematically<br />strong semi-classical system which, nevertheless, can proof theoretically<br />be reduced to primitive recursive arithmetic PRA. The proof of this fact relies<br />on functional interpretation and a majorization technique developed in a<br />previous paper.

Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


1973 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Howard ◽  
Herman Rubin ◽  
Jean Rubin

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