Set Theory INC# ∞# Based on Innitary Intuitionistic Logic with Restricted Modus Ponens Rule. Hyper Inductive Denitions. Application in Transcendental Number Theory. Generalized Lindemann-Weierstrass Theorem

In this paper intuitionistic set theory INC#∞# in infinitary set theoretical language is considered. External induction principle in nonstandard intuitionistic arithmetic were derived. Non trivial application in number theory is considered.The Goldbach-Euler theorem is obtained without any references to Catalan conjecture. Main results are: (i) number ee is transcendental; (ii) the both numbers e + π and e − π are irrational.

Set Theory INC# ∞# Based on Infinitary Intuitionistic Logic with Restricted Modus Ponens Rule (Part.II) Hyper Inductive Definitions

In this paper intuitionistic set theory INC# ∞# in infinitary set theoretical language is considered. External induction principle in nonstandard intuitionistic arithmetic were derived. Non trivial application in number theory is considered.The Goldbach-Euler theorem is obtained without anyreferences to Catalan conjecture.

Forcing and satisfaction in Kripke models of intuitionistic arithmetic

We define a class of first-order formulas $\mathsf{P}^{\ast }$ which exactly contains formulas $\varphi$ such that satisfaction of $\varphi$ in any classical structure attached to a node of a Kripke model of intuitionistic predicate logic deciding atomic formulas implies its forcing in that node. We also define a class of $\mathsf{E}$-formulas with the property that their forcing coincides with their classical satisfiability in Kripke models which decide atomic formulas. We also prove that any formula with this property is an $\mathsf{E}$-formula. Kripke models of intuitionistic arithmetical theories usually have this property. As a consequence, we prove a new conservativity result for Peano arithmetic over Heyting arithmetic.

INTERRELATION BETWEEN WEAK FRAGMENTS OF DOUBLE NEGATION SHIFT AND RELATED PRINCIPLES

We investigate two weak fragments of the double negation shift schema, which are motivated, respectively, from Spector’s consistency proof of ACA0 and from the negative translation of RCA0, as well as double negated variants of logical principles. Their interrelations over both intuitionistic arithmetic and analysis are completely solved.

The Problem of Consistency

This chapter talks about how the translations from classical to intuistic arithmetic that Gödel and Gentzen found in 1932–33 showed that the consistency of classical arithmetic reduces to that of intuitionistic arithmetic. The main aim of Hilbert's program in the 1920s had been to show that the infinitistic component of arithmetic, namely the use of quantificational inferences in indirect proofs, does not lead to contradiction. It followed from Gödel's and Gentzen's result that these classical steps are harmless. Therefore, the consistency problem of arithmetic has an intuitionistic sense and, consequently, possibly also an intuitionistic solution. Bernays was quick to point out that intuitionism transcends the boundaries of strictly finitary reasoning.

RAMSEY’S THEOREM FOR PAIRS ANDKCOLORS AS A SUB-CLASSICAL PRINCIPLE OF ARITHMETIC

The purpose is to study the strength of Ramsey’s Theorem for pairs restricted to recursive assignments ofk-many colors, with respect to Intuitionistic Heyting Arithmetic. We prove that for every natural number$k \ge 2$, Ramsey’s Theorem for pairs and recursive assignments ofkcolors is equivalent to the Limited Lesser Principle of Omniscience for${\rm{\Sigma }}_3^0$formulas over Heyting Arithmetic. Alternatively, the same theorem over intuitionistic arithmetic is equivalent to: for every recursively enumerable infinitek-ary tree there is some$i < k$and some branch with infinitely many children of indexi.

Arithmetic Certainty

This chapter considers the idea that we have certainty in our basic arithmetic knowledge. The claim that arithmetical knowledge enjoys certainty cannot be extended to a similar claim about number theory “as a whole.” It is thus necessary to distinguish between elementary number theory and other, more advanced, levels in the study of numbers: algebraic number theory, analytic number theory, and perhaps set-theoretic number theory. The chapter begins by arguing that the axioms of Peano Arithmetic are true of counting numbers and describing some elements found in counting practices. It then offers an account of basic arithmetic and its certainty before discussing a model theory of arithmetic and the logic of mathematics. Finally, it asks whether elementary arithmetic, built on top of the practice of counting, should be classical arithmetic or intuitionistic arithmetic.