6. The Epistemic Value of Religious Experience: Perceptual and Explanatory Models

Author(s):  
William Hasker
Author(s):  
Quinton Deeley

At Delphi in Greece the inspired oracle of Apollo, the Pythia, underwent a form of possession in which she was viewed as a vehicle for the god. Nevertheless, uncertainty has surrounded the exact nature of the experience of possession of the Pythia, and what could cause or motivate such experiences. This chapter explores the use of a range of explicit analogies and explanatory models to interpret the experience of the Pythia at the sanctuary of Apollo, and the broader context within which it occurred. Understanding of the Pythia can draw on explanatory models that reach beyond the categories of divination and possession. This includes not only the wider class of revelatory experiences in which supernatural agents (such as God or gods, demons, or spirits) speak or act through humans, but other types of experience involving alterations of the sense of identity and agency, whether they occur in psychopathology or as normal variations in experience. Examples include hallucinations and alien control phenomena in schizophrenia, and their analogues in religious experience; dissociation; and experiments combining suggestion and neuroimaging to model revelatory and possession states. All provide potential insights into the forms of experience, attributed significance, and causal processes involved in Apollo’s communication through the Pythia. They also point to the central role of ideas, expectations, and beliefs in influencing dissociations of the sense of self, and make the Pythia’s possession by Apollo seem less exotic, improbable, or deviant than it might once have seemed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-373
Author(s):  
FIONA ELLIS

AbstractI offer a new approach to the old question of the epistemic value of religious experience. According to this approach, religious experience is a species of desire, desire in this context involving a kind of experience which is cognitive and unmediated. The account is inspired by Levinas and Heidegger, and it involves a conception of experience which is shared by a disjunctivist account of perception. Perceptual disjunctivism is my starting point, and it provides the ground for the ensuing discussion of desire. In the final section of the article I argue that the parallel between perceptual disjunctivism and a Levinasian conception of desire points to a further strength in the account of desire here presented, namely, by suggesting the possibility of a disjunctive style response to scepticism about religious experience.


2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID SILVER

This paper examines Alvin Plantinga's defence of theistic belief in the light of Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists. Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga's defence of theism is not successful.


2002 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 294-297
Author(s):  
David M. Wulff
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