Tolerance and Counterpart Theory

Many philosophers have thought that Tolerance Puzzles can be easily dissolved by adopting some form of counterpart theory, which is roughly the view that being possibly a certain way is having a counterpart that is that way. This chapter shows how standard versions of counterpart theory involve radical departures from standard modal logic (going far beyond Iteration-denial) which we claim are unacceptable, and argues that once counterpart theory is developed in such a way as to avoid such logical revisionism, it has no special capacity to resolve the puzzles.

Wright and Revisionism

Do considerations in the theory of meaning pose a challenge to classical logic, and in particular to the law of excluded middle? Michael Dummett suggested an affirmative answer to this question, and advocated a form of logical revisionism. In his 1981 study “Anti-Realism and Revisionism,” Crispin Wright developed a critique of Dummett’s case for logical revisionism, but in more recent work (e.g., his 1992 book Truth and Objectivity), Wright has advanced an argument in favour of logical revisionism. This chapter investigates the nature and limitations of anti-realist revisionism, and offers a critique of Wright’s arguments in favour of logical revisionism. It also develops an alternative proposal about how revisionism might proceed.

Replies to Part III Logical Revisionism

This chapter provides a reply to the chapters in Part III of this book. First it considers the arguments of Neil Tennant, who has been a staunch supporter of the harmonic argument throughout his career. The chapter asks: why care about harmony? It looks at other related issues with harmony. It then turns to the ideas and arguments of Sanford Shieh as expressed in Chapter 8. It attempts to undermine Shieh’s scepticism.

Logic, Language, and Mathematics

This Festschrift volume contains a series of specially commissioned papers by leading philosophers on themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright and a previously unpublished paper by George Boolos, together with a substantial set of replies by Wright. Section I consists of five essays on Wright’s Neo-Fregean approach in the philosophy of mathematics, Section II consists of two essays on Wright’s work on vagueness, intuitionism and the Sorites Paradox, Section III contains two essays on logical revisionism, and Section IV consists of a single essay on the epistemology of metaphysical possibility. The volume also contains a full bibliography of Wright’s philosophical publications.