The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality

This paper offers a novel argument against the phenomenal intentionality thesis (or PIT for short). The argument, which I'll call the extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality, is centered around two claims: the first asserts that some source intentional states extend into the environment, while the second maintains that no conscious states extend into the environment. If these two claims are correct, then PIT is false, for PIT implies that the extension of source intentionality is predicated upon the extension of phenomenal consciousness. The argument is important because it undermines an increasingly prominent account of the nature of intentionality. PIT has entered the philosophical mainstream and is now a serious contender to naturalistic views of intentionality like the tracking theory and the functional role theory (Loar 1987, 2003; Searle 1990; Strawson 1994; Horgan and Tienson 2002; Pitt 2004; Farkas 2008; Kriegel 2013; Montague 2016; Bordini 2017; Forrest 2017; Mendelovici 2018). The extended mind argument against PIT challenges the popular sentiment that consciousness grounds intentionality.

Legislating for Same-Sex Marriage: Sophistical Effectiveness in Australian Law

This paper by-passes the various public tropes, such as “marriage equality”, and concentrates on determining whether or not a same-sex marriage law would be sophistically effective in Australia. It revives the ancient Greek sophistical rhetorical skill of proposing a law, and applies it as a critical context to the topic of legislating for same-sex marriage. The objective is to assess whether or not a same-sex marriage law will be effective in its legislative objects. It proposes to discuss whether the parliament could introduce such a law so that the law’s objects were achieved effectively in the public mind. Argument will try to show that introducing a law to create same-sex marriage would fail because of subsisting priestly legislation on the subject of marriage. Its two hypotheses are that the canon law and other English priestly legislation restrict the scope of marriage regulation, and marriage could not be re-defined to cover same-sex marriage. Sections of the paper examining the law historically employ the historiographical method of identifying underlying norms, the effect of which is occasional reverse chronologies. The article’s conclusion will assert that a statute for legal and duly registered same-sex marriage likely would be, according to sophistical rhetorical reasoning, a fiction misrepresenting the truth of the subsisting legal and social institutions of marriage.