Cave Art and the Evolution of the Human Mind

<p>The discovery of cave paintings made by our Upper Paleolithic ancestors in Western Europe was an astonishing find – so astonishing, that they were originally believed to have been fakes. However, as more sites were uncovered, their authenticity was confirmed. But how could these people, who at the time of the discovery were believed to be merely dumb brutes, create such beautiful and naturalistic representations? And an even more difficult question to answer was, why? In this thesis I examine the phenomenon of Paleolithic cave art and what it might be able to tell us about the minds of the Cro-Magnon artists who produced it. I survey the paintings that have so far been discovered, as well as the processes involved in creating them. I also discuss and critique a selection of the many theories that have attempted to explain the motivation behind this radically different type of human behaviour. But due to the lack of hard evidence, none of these theories are ever likely to be fully substantiated. So a more promising line of investigation I take is to appraise the cognitive abilities Cro-Magnons would have needed to produce the paintings – and this then allows me to consider whether cave art was indicating any new cognitive development. I therefore highlight one of the effects that creating cave paintings had: it allowed information from the brain to be stored in the environment. But the manner in which this form of epistemic engineering might enhance human cognition is a hotly debated subject. I examine two theories: the extended mind hypothesis, and the theory of niche construction. In concluding this thesis, I argue that cave art seems more like an example of epistemic niche construction than a constituent of an extended mind.</p>

Cave Art and the Evolution of the Human Mind

<p>The discovery of cave paintings made by our Upper Paleolithic ancestors in Western Europe was an astonishing find – so astonishing, that they were originally believed to have been fakes. However, as more sites were uncovered, their authenticity was confirmed. But how could these people, who at the time of the discovery were believed to be merely dumb brutes, create such beautiful and naturalistic representations? And an even more difficult question to answer was, why? In this thesis I examine the phenomenon of Paleolithic cave art and what it might be able to tell us about the minds of the Cro-Magnon artists who produced it. I survey the paintings that have so far been discovered, as well as the processes involved in creating them. I also discuss and critique a selection of the many theories that have attempted to explain the motivation behind this radically different type of human behaviour. But due to the lack of hard evidence, none of these theories are ever likely to be fully substantiated. So a more promising line of investigation I take is to appraise the cognitive abilities Cro-Magnons would have needed to produce the paintings – and this then allows me to consider whether cave art was indicating any new cognitive development. I therefore highlight one of the effects that creating cave paintings had: it allowed information from the brain to be stored in the environment. But the manner in which this form of epistemic engineering might enhance human cognition is a hotly debated subject. I examine two theories: the extended mind hypothesis, and the theory of niche construction. In concluding this thesis, I argue that cave art seems more like an example of epistemic niche construction than a constituent of an extended mind.</p>

Updating the Abstract-Concrete Distinction in Ancient Near Eastern Numbers

The characterization of early token-based accounting using a concrete concept of number, later numerical notations an abstract one, has become well entrenched in the literature. After reviewing its history and assumptions, this article challenges the abstract-concrete distinction, presenting an alternative view of change in Ancient Near Eastern number concepts, wherein numbers are abstract from their inception and materially bound when most elaborated. The alternative draws on the chronological sequence of material counting technologies used in the Ancient Near East—fingers, tallies, tokens, and numerical notations—as reconstructed through archaeological and textual evidence and as interpreted through Material Engagement Theory, an extended-mind framework in which materiality plays an active role (Malafouris 2013).

Shedding Light on the Extended Mind: HoloLens, Holograms, and Internet-Extended Knowledge

The application of extended mind theory to the Internet and Web yields the possibility of Internet-extended knowledge—a form of extended knowledge that arises as a result of an individual's interactions with the online environment. The present paper seeks to advance our understanding of Internet-extended knowledge by describing the functionality of a real-world application, called the HoloArt app. In part, the goal of the paper is illustrative: it is intended to show how recent advances in mixed reality, cloud-computing, and machine intelligence might be combined so as to yield a putative case of Internet-extended knowledge. Beyond this, however, the paper is intended to support the philosophical effort to understand the notions of extended knowledge and the extended mind. In particular, the HoloArt app raises questions about the universality of some of the criteria that have been used to evaluate putative cases of cognitive extension. The upshot is a better appreciation of the way in which claims about extended knowledge and the extended mind might be affected by a consideration of technologically-advanced resources.

THE PROBLEM OF BOUNDARIES OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

The article deals with a controversial problem of the philosophy of mind, known as the problem of cognitive boundaries. This problem is illustrated by the polemic between two actively debating philosophical positions – internalism, according to which mental states are localized in the brain, and externalism, which assumes that cognitive acts are not limited to our body. The author analyzes Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s theory of extended cognitive processes and the extended mind, which is fundamentally new for the modern philosophy of mind and has taken on relevance today. It is shown that this concept is based on the idea of subject’s activity, which has its roots in James Gibson’s “ecological psychology”, Francisco Varela’s idea of “embodied cognition” and Alva Noë’s theory of sensorimotor enactivism. The author comes to the conclusion that the theory of extended cognitive processes has a number of deficiencies, one of which is the dependence on external resources and tools. David Chalmers’s thesis that we should not try to neutralize the negative effects of such dependency, but rather try to adapt our practices to the changing ways of thinking is seen as the way out of this problem.

The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality

This paper offers a novel argument against the phenomenal intentionality thesis (or PIT for short). The argument, which I'll call the extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality, is centered around two claims: the first asserts that some source intentional states extend into the environment, while the second maintains that no conscious states extend into the environment. If these two claims are correct, then PIT is false, for PIT implies that the extension of source intentionality is predicated upon the extension of phenomenal consciousness. The argument is important because it undermines an increasingly prominent account of the nature of intentionality. PIT has entered the philosophical mainstream and is now a serious contender to naturalistic views of intentionality like the tracking theory and the functional role theory (Loar 1987, 2003; Searle 1990; Strawson 1994; Horgan and Tienson 2002; Pitt 2004; Farkas 2008; Kriegel 2013; Montague 2016; Bordini 2017; Forrest 2017; Mendelovici 2018). The extended mind argument against PIT challenges the popular sentiment that consciousness grounds intentionality.

What Should We Do With People Who Cannot or Do Not Want to Be Protected From Neurotechnological Threats?

Neurotechnologies can pose a threat to people’s privacy and mental integrity. Hence the proposal of establishing neurorights (Ienca and Andorno, 2017) and technical principles for the implementation of these rights (Lavazza, 2018). However, concepts such as “the extended mind” and what might be called “the post-human objection” can be said to challenge this protection paradigm. On the one hand, it may be difficult to outline the cognitive boundaries between humans and machines (with the consequent ethical and legal implications). On the other hand, those who wish to make strong use of neurotechnologies, or even hybridize with them, reject the idea that privacy and mental integrity should be protected. However, from the latter view, issues may arise relating to the protection of persons entering into relationships with posthumanist people. This article will discuss these scenarios as well as the ethical, legal, social, and political issues that could follow from them.