Investigating the Effects of Tactile Masking and Surface Texture on the Velvet Hand Illusion

When we hold thin metallic bars between the palms of our hands and rub the palms against each other, the feeling of touching smooth velvet occurs. Previous studies have shown that tactile motion and pressure on the palms are important for this velvet hand illusion. Interestingly, when we experience this illusion, we cannot feel the texture of our palms as we usually do. In the present study, we investigated the possibility that tactile masking contributes to the occurrence of the velvet hand illusion. We measured vibrotactile detection performance on the palms of the hands during the occurrence of the velvet hand illusion. The detection performance was worse when the illusion occurred than when it did not. Moreover, the degradation of the detection performance correlated positively with the subjective magnitude of the illusion. We also examined whether additional surface texture could affect the occurrence of the illusion and found that the illusion became weaker as the roughness of the surface increased. These findings suggest that tactile motion and pressure information delivered by the bars of smooth surface mask tactile sensations on the palms of the hands, resulting in an illusory smooth, frictionless feeling on the palms.

Parsing Pain Perception Between Nociceptive Representation and Magnitude Estimation

Assessing the size of objects rapidly and accurately clearly has survival value. A central multisensory module for subjective magnitude assessment is therefore highly likely, suggested by psychophysical studies, and proposed on theoretical grounds. Given that pain perception is fundamentally an assessment of stimulus intensity, it must necessarily engage such a central module. Accordingly, we compared functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activity of pain magnitude ratings to matched visual magnitude ratings in 14 subjects. We show that brain activations segregate into two groups, one preferentially activated for pain and another equally activated for both visual and pain magnitude ratings. The properties of regions in the first group were consistent with encoding nociception, whereas those in the second group with attention and task control. Insular cortex responses similarly segregated to a pain-specific area and an area (extending to the lateral prefrontal cortex) conjointly representing perceived magnitudes for pain and vision. These two insular areas were differentiated by their relationship to task variance, ability to encode perceived magnitudes for each stimulus epoch, temporal delay differences, and brain intrinsic functional connectivity. In a second group of subjects ( n = 11) we contrasted diffusion tensor imaging–based white matter connectivity for these two insular areas and observed anatomical connectivity closely corresponding to the functional connectivity identified with fMRI. These results demonstrate that pain perception is due to the transformation of nociceptive representation into subjective magnitude assessment within the insula. Moreover, we argue that we have identified a multisensory cortical area for “how much” complementary and analogous to the “where” and “what” as described for central visual processing.

Is Subjective Shortening in Human Memory Unique to Time Representations?

Three experiments compared forgetting of the duration of a bar-like visual stimulus with forgetting of its length. The main aim of the experiments was to investigate whether subjective shortening (a decrease in the subjective magnitude of a stimulus as its retention interval increased) was observable in length judgements as well as in time judgements, where subjective shortening has been often observed previously. On all trials of the three experiments, humans received two briefly presented coloured bars, separated by adelay ranging from 1 to 10 s, and the bars could differ in length, duration of presentation, or both. In Experiment 1 two groups of subjects made either length or duration judgements, and subjective shortening-type forgetting functions were observed only for duration. Experiments 2 and 3 used the same general procedure, but the stimuli judged could differ both in length and duration within a trial, and different subject groups (Experiment 2) or the same subjects in two conditions (Experiment 3) made either length or duration judgements of stimuli, which were on average physically identical. Subjective shortening was only found with duration, and never with length, supporting the view that subjective shortening may be unique to time judgements.