Dimensions of Perceptual Content

This chapter presents a causal theory of perception according to which perceiving something is, in outline, equivalent to its producing or sustaining, in the right way, a phenomenal representation of it. Commonly, the perceived object plays this causal role reliably enough to yield perceptual knowledge, provided we form perceptual beliefs that appropriately correspond to what we see. But the theory does not imply that seeing is conceptual, entails believing, or has propositional perceptual content. The notion of content is clarified, and several types are described, including a hallucinatory kind. This causal representational view also accommodates “inner perception” of elements, such as images—as is appropriate to the breadth of “perception.” But the most important point here is that explaining the causal character of the perceptual relation partly on the basis of information represented in the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience does not entail the perceiver’s acquiring beliefs that propositionalize that information.