EFFECT OF MULTI-MEDIA APPROACHON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED COMPETENCIES IN MATHEMATICS AMONG SLUM STUDENTS

Since Independence, UEE has been solitary imperative goal of educational progress in India. To achieve UEE, Government of India has initiated numerous programmes but it is sad that dropout rate is not declined. A foremost percentage of the dropouts comprises of socially underprivileged children. Most of the children have to effort very hard to earn their livelihood, and reside in slums. Recent approaches in the education technology like applications of multimedia by computer technology prove to cater to the various requirements of students in the educational system. Multimedia is a sole medium with structures of quality, audio-visual recording, and sound effects. Using Multimedia Approach, in teaching-learning process, is a perceptual knowledge, and as outcome students acquires the concepts and skills effectively. The present study was carried out with the objective to study the effect of the multi-media approach in relation to traditional approach in fostering selected Mathematics Competencies among Slum Students. The sample of the study was 40 slum students of standard six. The pre-posttest experimental design was followed for the present research study. The treatment for the Experimental group was given by the investigator for 40 sessions specically to foster Mathematics Competencies using a specially designed instructional material. Analysis of the results revealed, that Multi-Media Approach was signicantly more effective than of the traditional approach in fostering selected Mathematics Competencies among Slum students. Educational implications of the study were discussed in the study

Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge

According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlements and commitments of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects.

Aristotle's Empiricism

Aristotle is famous for thinking that all our knowledge comes from perception. But it’s not immediately clear what this view is meant to entail. For it’s not clear what perception is supposed to contribute to the more advanced forms of knowledge that derive from it, or indeed how we should understand the nature of its contribution—what it might mean to say that these more advanced forms of knowledge are “derived from” or “based on” what we perceive. Aristotle is often thought to have disappointingly little to say on these matters. I argue here that this thought is mistaken: a coherent and philosophically attractive view of perceptual knowledge can be found in the various texts in which Aristotle discusses perception’s role in animal life, the cognitive resources on which it does and does not depend, and the relation it bears to practical and theoretical modes of understanding. What emerges from these discussions is a moderate form of empiricism—an empiricism on which we can develop sophisticated forms of knowledge by broadly perceptual means, but nonetheless rely on our intellectual powers for more advanced forms of understanding. I consider the role this empiricism plays in Aristotle’s account of our learning, and its implications for his views about practical wisdom and the cognitive lives of nonrational animals.

Illuminating the Mind

This book provides readers with an introduction to epistemology within the Buddhist intellectual tradition. It is designed to be accessible to those whose primary background is in the “Western” tradition of philosophy and who have little or no previous exposure to Buddhist philosophical writings. The book examines many of the most important topics in the field of epistemology, topics that are central both to contemporary discussions of epistemology and to the classical Buddhist tradition of epistemology in India and Tibet. Among the topics discussed are Buddhist accounts of the nature of knowledge episodes, the defining conditions of perceptual knowledge and of inferential knowledge, the status of testimonial knowledge, and skeptical criticisms of the entire project of epistemology. The book seeks to put the field of Buddhist epistemology in conversation with contemporary debates in philosophy. It shows that many of the arguments and debates occurring within classical Buddhist epistemological treatises coincide with the arguments and disagreements found in contemporary epistemology. The book shows, for example, how Buddhist epistemologists developed an anti-luck epistemology—one that is linked to a sensitivity requirement for knowledge. Likewise, the book explores the question of how the study of Buddhist epistemology can be of relevance to contemporary debates about the value of contributions from experimental epistemology, and to broader debates concerning the use of philosophical intuitions about knowledge.

Perception

This chapter provides an overview of Buddhist accounts of perceptual knowledge as articulated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. It identifies the key features of these two epistemologists’ accounts of perception and discusses the important ways in which these two thinkers’ accounts differ from one another. The second half of the chapter explores the question of how far the scope of perceptual knowledge can be extended and looks at the various subtypes of perception that are adopted by Buddhist epistemologists including reflexive perception, mental perception and yogic perception. The chapter concludes by exploring how perceptual cognitions differ from instances of illusion and hallucination.

Losing Knowledge by Thinking about Thinking

Defeat cases are often taken to show that even the most securely based judgment can be rationally undermined by misleading evidence. Starting with some best-case scenario for perceptual knowledge, for example, it is possible to undermine the subject’s confidence in her sensory faculties until it becomes unreasonable for her to persist in her belief. Some have taken such cases to indicate that any basis for knowledge is rationally defeasible; others have argued that there can be unreasonable knowledge. I argue that defeat cases really involve not an exposure of weakness in the basis of a judgment, but a shift in that basis. For example, when threatening doubts are raised about whether conditions are favorable for perception, one shifts from a basis of unreflective perceptual judgment to a basis of conscious inference. In these cases, the basis of one’s knowledge is lost, rather than rationally undermined. This approach to defeat clears the path for a new way to defend infallibilism in epistemology, and a new understanding of what can count as the basis of any instance of knowledge.

The symmetry problem for testimonial conservatism

A prima facie plausible and widely held view in epistemology is that the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of testimonial knowledge are stronger than the epistemic standards governing the acquisition of perceptual knowledge. Conservatives about testimony hold that we need prior justification to take speakers to be reliable but recognise that the corresponding claim about perception is practically a non-starter. The problem for conservatives is how to establish theoretically significant differences between testimony and perception that would support asymmetrical epistemic standards. In this paper I defend theoretical symmetry of testimony and perception on the grounds that there are no good reasons for taking these two belief forming methods to have significant theoretical differences. I identify the four central arguments in defence of asymmetry and show that in each case either they fail to establish the difference that they purport to establish or they establish a difference that is not theoretically significant.

Specialty coffee in Brazil: transition among consumers' constructs using structural equation modeling

PurposeBuilding on Guimarães et al. (2019) study and using the modeling of structural equations, the objective of this paper was to elaborate constructs whose variables would enable the characterization and distinction of individuals among these different groups of consumers and to provide insights into their transition between them.Design/methodology/approachThe constructs were validated by the average variance extracted adaptive (AVEADP) index. The transition between consumer groups is explained and encouraged by advances in their conceptual and perceptual knowledge. Thus, regular consumers should be addressed with messages aimed primarily for the social aspect of consumption; enthusiasts, by reinforcing simple to moderate aspects commonly used as product purchase criteria and experts, attracted by the emphasis on complex criteria related to specialty coffee's conceptual and perceptual knowledge, highlighting their influence on the beverage's sensory profile.FindingsThose results enabled a better understanding of these consumers and can guide the marketing strategies of different actors in this market.Originality/valueImportant attempts to understand and characterize Brazilian specialty coffee consumers were conducted by Guimarães et al. (2019) and Ramírez-Correa et al. (2020). However, further studies are needed to differentiate different specialty coffee consumer groups and enhance the market applicability of those studies results. In addition, despite its importance, there is a paucity of public domain studies about the national consumption of specialty coffees, being the results of this work important for the wide dissemination of such information.