The Variability of Mental Timeline in Vertical Dimension

People often use concrete spatial terms to represent abstract time. Previous studies have shown that mental timeline (MTL) is represented along a horizontal axis. Studies of the mental timeline have demonstrated that compared with English speakers, Mandarin speakers are more likely to think about time vertically (up-down) than horizontally (left-right/front-back). Prior studies have suggested that MTL in the up and down dimensions originated from temporal-spatial metaphors in language. However, there are still a large number of perceptual experiences in the up and down dimensions, such as visual and sensorimotor experience. Then does the visual experience in daily life affect the MTL in the vertical dimension? This study is aimed to investigate whether visual experience can promote or activate the opposite direction of MTL from implicit and explicit levels. The results showed that when the time information in the task was not prominent, the direction of vertical MTL cannot be affected by ascending or descending perceptual experience. While when the time information was prominent, whether the task was implicit or explicit, compared with the control group, watching the top-down scene significantly increased the top-down direction selection, while in the implicit task, watching the bottom-up scene made the top-down MTL disappear. To the best of our knowledge, our study provides the first evidence that the flexibility of space–time associations in vertical dimension extends beyond explicit and embraces even implicit levels. This study shows that the vertical MTL is activated in certain conditions and could be affected by the visual experience.

Curiosity Emerging From the Perception of Change in Music

Music offers a useful opportunity to consider the factors contributing to the experience of curiosity in the context of dynamically changing stimuli. Here, we tested the hypothesis that the perception of change in music triggers curiosity as to how the heard music will unfold. Participants were presented with unfamiliar musical excerpts and asked to provide continuous ratings of their subjective experience of curiosity and calm, and their perception of change, as the music unfolded. As hypothesized, we found that for all musical pieces, the perceptual experience of change Granger-caused feelings of curiosity but not feelings of calm. Our results suggest music is a powerful tool with which to examine the factors contributing to curiosity induction. Accordingly, we outline ways in which extensions to the approach taken here may be useful: both in elucidating our information-seeking drive more generally, and in elucidating the manifestation of this drive during music listening.

Selectionism and Diaphaneity

Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been argued that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds.

Apical Amplification – A Cellular Mechanism of Conscious Perception?

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations fornetwork-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience.Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cellsare summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. Theseinputs come from diverse sources, and provide a context within which thetransmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal andperisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apicalamplification (AA) enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it moreflexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. AA providesa possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strongloops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspacetheories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of theindividual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms thatcontribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As AAis highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, itrelates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental statesand to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendritesprovide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selectiveamplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

Number Concepts Are Constructed through Material Engagement: A Reply to Sutliff, Read, and Everett

I respond to three responses to my 2015 Current Anthropology article, “Numerosity Structures the Expression of Quantity in Lexical Numbers and Grammatical Number.” This study examined the categorical and geographical distribution of lexical numbers, also known as counting numbers, and grammatical number, the ability to linguistically distinguish singular and plural. Both these features of language conform to the perceptual experience of quantity, which consists of subitization, the ability to rapidly and unambiguously identify one, two, and three, and magnitude appreciation, the ability to appreciate bigger and smaller in the numerical quantity of groups when the difference lies above a threshold of noticeability. My reply to Sutliff disagrees with her contention that mathematical ideas are mentally innate on the grounds that this ignores their explicit construction through the interaction of human psychological, physiological, and behavioral abilities with materiality. My reply to Read expands on the idea that language obscures cross-cultural conceptual variability in number concepts because everything that translates as “three” does not necessarily have the same numerical properties. Finally, my reply to Everett notes that investigating numerical origins means discarding the deeply entrenched assumption of linguistic primacy on the grounds that material forms make numerical intuitions tangible, visible, and manipulable in ways that language cannot and, moreover, provide an alinguistic bootstrap mechanism that accounts for the emergence of both concepts of number and words for the concepts.

Materiality and the Prehistory of Number

Modern humans produce number systems with striking cross-cultural similarities. Understanding prehistoric numerical cognition, however, requires looking at when cognitive prerequisites emerged: morphological factors like parietal encephalization; abilities like quantity perception, language, concept formation and manipulation, categorization, and ordinality; and demographic factors suggesting societal motivations for numerical development. These establish the “probably not before” timeline for numerical emergence. The question is then approached from the earliest emergence of unambiguous numbers in Mesopotamia, clay tokens used in the late 4th millennium and subsequent numerical notations. With tokens and notations, the archaeological and textual evidence of precursor technologies like tallies and fingers form a sequence capable of elaborating the innate perceptual experience of quantity into simple counting sequences and complex mathematics. Along with the cognitive prerequisites, the sequence of material forms also provides insight into potential archaeological evidence (material forms and demographic factors) that might indicate numerical emergence in prehistoric times.

Expérimenter la pensée en schémas-images. Des adolescents s’interrogent « d’où viennent les pensées ? »

"Experimenting Thinking in Image Schemas. Teenagers are Wondering “Where Do Thoughts Come From?” An intellectual view of philosophy as an activity focusing on understanding abstract concepts and their relationships deprives philosophical exercise of the participation of the body and senses. If we reject the mind-body dualism, as Dewey, Johnson, etc. did, then we are constantly engaged in interactions with the world and others, and can thus consider the act of thinking from our own experiences. Inspired by an experimentalist conception of school and life, as well as the method of inquiry developed by Dewey, the Philosophy for Children program provides an inquiry process that invites participants to conceptualize and reason philosophically in a collaborative manner. Do these practices implement an embodied cognition? To find out, we selected a discussion as a case study and analyzed it based on the observation that the issue to be discussed by the participants - “where do thoughts come from?” contains two image schemas: path (come from) and source (where). We have noted a variety and a significant number of expressions (“they come from within”, “they come from what happens outside”, etc.) whose analysis enhances a better understanding of how an experience of understanding the origins of our thoughts fits into the discourse and contributes to a collective conceptualization of “thinking”. Keywords: image schemas, perceptual experience, conceptualisation, community of philosophical inquiry, experimentalism "

Externalists Should Be Sense-Datum Theorists

One increasingly popular view in the philosophy of perception is externalism about sensible qualities, according to which sensible qualities such as colors, smells, tastes, and textures are features, not of our minds, but of mind-independent, external objects in the world. The primary motivation for this view is that perceptual experience seems to be transparent—that is, when we attend to sensible qualities, it seems like what we are attending to are features of external objects, not our own minds. Most (if not all) externalists are either naïve realists or externalist representationalists. However, in this article, I argue that those who are moved by the primary motivation for externalism should instead be sense-datum theorists, for externalists’ primary motivation supports the sense-datum theory, not their actually favored views. I argue that externalists should focus on different motivations, get new ones, or become sense-datum theorists.