Metaethical Implications

In this chapter, we show that moral uncertainty creates a challenge for another metaethical view, namely non-cognitivism, according to which moral judgements are desires, or some other desire-like states, rather than beliefs. We show that it is surprisingly difficult, though perhaps not impossible, for non-cognitivists to accommodate moral uncertainty, for they lack the resources to adequately distinguish degrees of moral confidence and degrees of value ascribed to things. We discuss Lenman’s and Ridge’s versions of ecumenical expressivism and argue that neither are able to satisfactorilty explain moral uncertainty. We consider Sepielli’s defense, based on the ‘being for’ account of normative certitude, but argue that it, too, suffers from grave problems.

Can Young’s constructive ecumenical expressivism resolve the gamer’s dilemma?

Purpose This paper aims to evaluate a potential resolution to the gamer’s dilemma that arises from Gary Young’s metaethical theory of constructive ecumenical expressivism (CEE). Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the gamer’s dilemma is reformulated as a paradox and the potential resolution is evaluated in light of this new formulation. Findings The author argues that this resolution does resolve the dilemma, but CEE itself has limited appeal. Originality/value This paper contributes to the growing scholarship dedicated to resolving the gamer’s dilemma.

Enacting Immorality Within Gamespace

This chapter considers three arguments for the selective prohibition of representations of violent or otherwise taboo actions within video games (known as symbolic taboo activities). These arguments are based on harm, meaningful expression, and player motivation, respectively. It shows how each argument is problematic. It introduces constructive ecumenical expressivism, which seeks to explain how objectified moral norms are constructed and therefore what is involved in demarcating one type of enactment immoral and another not. Such a normative position is concerned more with how, within a given society, selective prohibition is established, and therefore how that society determines where the line ought to be drawn regarding symbolic taboo activities, than it is with the application of some form of moral absolutism to virtual enactments.